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I. Abstract 
Caste is a hierarchical system, distinguishing people’s status by determining one’s purity and 
pollution. Indian structure of society has been formed by a Hindu conviction through 
generations, institutionalised through culture and religious structures. This makes caste 
difficult to change.  
The problem statement in this study is: why, and how, is India protecting the caste system at 
the national and international arena? The problem statement is studied from both a national 
and international level, using a deductive approach at the national level and an inductive 
approach at the international level. The national level looks at what the Indian National 
Congress (INC) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) considers to be national identity, and 
whether caste is included. The international level focuses on the current situation of the non-
governmental organisation (NGO) International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN). Executive 
director of IDSN, Rikke Nöhrlind was interviewed.  
The study, at both levels, are based on both primary and secondary literature. This is a 
maximum variation sampling, capturing different perspectives related to the problem 
statement. The attempt has been to gain greater insights to the problem statement by looking 
at it from all angles, identifying common themes across the sample. 
At the national arena, the study find that caste has become an integral part of the parties’ view 
of Indian national identity, making it hard to change. At the international arena, it seems India 
is protective of the term caste. It is seen as a “private” term belonging to India as a nation. 
IDSN, working to abolish caste discrimination, is hindered from attaining the Economic and 
Social Council’s (ECOSOC’s) status. The ECOSOC status is important as it legitimates 
NGOs within the United Nations (UN). IDSN currently has the longest awaiting application. 
This is caused by the committee member India’s frequent and duplicated questions. In short, 
the study find that caste has been incorporated into Hinduism and has thereby also become a 
part of Indian national identity.  
Keywords: India, caste, Indian National Congress (INC), Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 
International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN). 
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1.0 Introduction  
“As this world, that can be known through knowledge, is limited to us owing to our 
ignorance, so the world of personality, that can be realized by our own personal self, is also 
restricted by the limit of our sympathy and imagination. In the dim twilight of insensitiveness 
a large part of our world remains to us like a procession of nomadic shadows”.                     
 - Rabindranath Tagore, The Religion of Man  (Tagore 1931: 131-132).  
 
1.1 Objective of the study  
In India, caste and religion has a distinct connection which is forming a hierarchical structure 
of society, based on a Hindu belief (Flood 1996: 12). I would like to investigate this 
relationship further. What is caste? How did caste arise in India? What is its political 
challenges? What is India’s main political parties’ view on caste? How does India treat caste 
at the international arena? My purpose is to highlight the importance of discussing caste, and 
investigate further what I believe is an unlimited relationship between India and caste. I want 
to explain why these questions needs to be raised, and additionally to provide them with 
answers. Most of all I would like to contribute to the international debate regarding this issue, 
by analysing the significance caste has for India’s national identity.  
 
1.2 Background 
Caste is a hierarchical system, distinguishing peoples’ status by determining one’s purity and 
pollution (Flood 1996: 58). Worldwide, approximately 260 million people are predestined an 
existence in the caste system. People are placed on a hierarchical scale with unequal rights.  
The lowest caste is denoted as the most “impure”. Hence, the people below the castes are 
called the “untouchables” (from now they will be referred to as Dalits). Dalits are given the 
most dangerous and unskilled jobs. They are excluded from the socio-cultural, economic and 
political rights, keeping them in poverty (IDSN N.d. a: 2).  
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Indian structure of society has been formed by a Hindu conviction through generations, 
institutionalised through culture and religious structures. This makes it difficult to change. 
The caste system has also been transferred to some Indian Christian societies where the 
religious ideas originally does not belong. There should also be noted that caste exists in 
some Muslim communities in the world. The relation between religion and caste, is therefore 
not exclusively Hindu (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014). Caste discrimination may be found in various 
degrees in India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Japan, Micronesia, Senegal, 
Yemen, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Chad, Ghana, Mauritania, Mauritius, Madagascar, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Somalia. Due to the world increasing migration, caste has also 
become a part of the diaspora communities and hence: is a global issue  (IDSN August 2014: 
7). It should however be noted that the focus of this study is on caste solely in India.  
 
1.3 Research survey  
The main focus of this assignment is the relationship between national identity and religion. 
Anthony D. Smith focuses on the theory of national identity, and emphasises that ethnicity 
and religion are its main resources. The most important of the two is religion which is the 
very essence of national identities, according to Smith (Smith 2003: 25).  Smith’s theory is 
applied to explain India’s national and international politics related to caste.  
Martha Nussbaum, in her book The Clash Within Democracy, Religious Violence, and 
India’s Future, relates the challenge of caste and human rights to politics. Nussbaum reveals 
how the forces of the Hindu right pose a disturbing threat to India’s democratic traditions. 
Nussbaum’s book is valuable as it describes the challenges in which India is facing today: 
regarding caste, national identity and politics. Nussbaum further show the current situation by 
describing unique events, the rise of the Hindu right, controversies about the writing of 
national history, and the gloomy situation of the Indian education system (Nussbaum 2007). 
Her book is an important contribution as it functions as a background for this assignment, 
while providing good examples related to the two main political parties.  
Dag Erik Berg’s PhD dissertation at the University of Bergen (Norway), is called Dalits and 
the Constitutional State. Untouchability, Dalit Movements and Legal Approaches to Equality 
and Social Justice for India’s Scheduled Castes. Berg describes how Dalits, from before 
Independence in 1947 until today, have tried to improve their situation. Berg believes they 
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have become an “integral part of India’s constitutional state” due to their designation as 
Scheduled Castes, entitling them with certain provisions (Berg 2011: ix). Berg describes two 
opposing trends in the Dalit situation: “the upward social mobility contrasting with enduring 
atrocities” (Ibid: x). He argues that “the legal developments and responses to the Dalit 
situation affirm the complexity of caste and inequalities in the legal framework” (Ibid: ix). 
Berg says that this reflect on a:                  
 Deeper structural and ideological tension in India’s modernity between systems represented by 
 values of equality and citizenship on one hand and hierarchy on the other. The social dynamics are 
 integrated  in the legal framework, revealing the complexity of the problems (Ibid: x).  
It would seem that the majority of previous research is related to the relationship between 
caste and human rights. Sebastian Velassery in Casteism and Human Rights. Toward an 
Ontology of the Social Order discusses the contextual nature of casteism, bearing upon issues 
as human rights, its dynamics and its philosophical meaning (Velassery 2005). Arvind 
Sharma’s study: Hinduism and Human Rights. A Conceptual Approach tackles the theme of 
human rights from a Hindu viewpoint, also covering themes such as caste (Sharma 2004). 
Sharma seems to believe it is possible to reconcile caste and human rights. He describes what 
he believes are the bases of human rights in Hinduism, translating kᾱma, artha, dharma and 
mokṣa to “the sensate, politico-economic, moral, and metaphysical dimensions of human 
existence” (Sharma 2004: 10). Sharma writes: 
The ethical view of human rights connects with the dimension of kᾱma in the sense that it involves the 
assessment of the relative merits of the elements desired (kᾱma = desire) by the individual vis-à-vis the 
community. The legal view can be linked with  artha, which takes a positivistic view of law. The moral 
view of human rights can similarly be connected to dharma and the religious view of mokṣa. Hindu 
thinking is strongly in favour of grounding human rights in morality or dharma. For grounding it in 
kᾱma would be too hedonistic, in artha too positivistic and arbitrary, and in mokṣa too remote and 
transgressive. Grounding human rights in a moral vision would mean grounding them on their home 
ground (Ibid: 11).   
Modern democracy gives its citizens rights (Benhabib 2006: 32). Seyla Benahbib believes 
we, since the UN Human Rights were declared in 1948, have gained cosmopolitan norms, 
unlike previously when they were international. While international laws and regulations 
refer to states and organisations, cosmopolitan laws and regulations refers to the individual 
(Ibid: 15-16). Because human rights have a universalistic moral standpoint, they mean to 
include all mankind, not just those within certain borders (Ibid: 18). The question is how the 
democratic majority may be reconciled with cosmopolitan rights. This is what Benhabib calls 
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the “democratic legitimacy paradox”. Human rights are supposed to be universal, while 
democracy has a distinction between members and the outside (Ibid: 17). It is given that 
moral obligations and bonds you have as a member within a given community, and moral 
obligations and bonds you have as a human being, at times creates friction. (Ibid: 18-19). 
Heiner Bielefeldt (2000), K. Raman Pillai (1990), Maina Kiai (2014), Peter Willetts (1996; 
2011), Rochelle Jones (2014), Smita Narula (1999), and W. J. Basil Fernando (2002) further 
contributes with their research regarding the challenges of human rights, state sovereignty 
and caste. Together these views might help explaining the complexity of the situation.  
NGOs have gained an integral role within the UN, which has led the latter having initiated 
various strategies in order to integrate NGOs even more. Various researchers have studied 
how NGOs achieve success within the UN. (Martens 2005: 8). Peter Willetts (1996; 2011) 
believes NGOs rights are determined by the level of trust established between NGO 
representatives and government delegates (Willetts 2011: 62). Martha Finnemore and 
Kathryn Sikkink (1998) have done research on norms. They believe norms related to 
“equality” and “bodily harm” has the best “transnational resonance”  (Finnmore 1998: 907). 
These different authors may help explain the relationship between NGOs and the UN, seeing 
whether or not NGOs related to caste is easier adaptable in the UN. 
All of the authors mentioned above are, in some way or another, related to the subjects in this 
assignment. Topics such as caste, religion, national identity, human rights, politics, NGOs 
and the UN were all mentioned. What this study is attempting to do however, is to integrate 
all of these topics. These topics are highly related. By investigating the challenge of caste 
from both a micro (national) and macro (international) perspective, all of these topics comes 
together and are stirred into a melting pot. I have yet to discover a source which discusses all 
of these factors at once, both from a national and international level. By undertaking such a 
study, I believe it will become highly evident that India is trying to “protect” the caste system 
from any bad reviews.  
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1.4 Problem definition  
There are several factors to show for in order to back up the claim that India is trying to 
shield, protect and safeguard the caste system: 
1. India’s view on caste and discrimination. 
2. International Dalit Solidarity Network’s (IDSN’s) application to the Economic and 
 Social Council (ECOSOC). 
3. The challenge of human rights and state sovereignty.  
4. The challenge of democracy and election.  
 
1.4.1 India’s view on caste and discrimination  
Racial discrimination is by the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), article 1, defined as:  
 Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or 
 ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoy mentor 
 exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
 social, cultural or any other field of public life (Jones 07.02.2014).  
February 2007 there was made a report to CERD, by the Indian government, where India 
denies that discrimination based on caste is included in the Convention mentioned above. 
They therefore evaded the obligation of mentioning caste in the report. The incident indicates 
that India does not acknowledging caste as discrimination. (Jones 07.02.2014).  
In the aftermath, CERD objected to India’s statements by saying that caste is indeed 
implicated by the convention. CERD further demanded that caste should be included in 
India’s next report (Jones 07.02.2014).  
 
1.4.2. International Dalit Solidarity Network’s (IDSN’s) application to the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
working to get: “full recognition of caste discrimination as one of the most serious and most 
important human rights issues in the world” (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014).  
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IDSN currently has the longest awaiting application to the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). This status is the only framework giving NGOs participation rights within the 
United Nations (UN) (UN 2011: 2). More importantly, the status legitimises NGOs presence 
in the political process (Willetts 2011: 38-39).  
IDSN’ application has meet great obstacles. In order to gain consultative status, IDSN is 
obligated to respond to questions raised by the committee. The committee member India is 
continuously raising new questions which extends IDSN application process. Despite 
fulfilling all of the requirements, their application is still pending (IDSN October 2014; 
Nöhrlind 17.11.2014).  
The intention of the ECOSOC resolution is to ensure NGOs participation rights in the UN. It 
is therefore alarming that this very committee seem to be exploited by one of its members 
(IDSN 29.10.2014). It also describes India’s current power position in the committee. 
 
1.4.3. The challenge of human rights and state sovereignty 
There exist numerous definitions of human rights. This study will use the definition of Njål 
Høstmælingen who points at the complexity of the term. Thus, Human Rights are the: “basic 
rights and freedoms individuals have above state authorities, and which follows international 
agreements and practice”  (Høstmælingen 2003: 27). Høstmælingen further states:     
 An important point is that individuals have rights but no duties, and conversely that the state 
 authorities have duties but no rights. Another point is that it is the states which creates rights and 
 obligations. A third point is that the state should not only respect the individual rights and freedoms, 
 but also positively ensure that these are protected and fulfilled. A fourth point is that it is the 
 international norms, and not human rights that is stemming from national laws (Ibid: 27).  
Human rights and state sovereignty may have dissimilar missions, as the international and 
UN law may contradict each other. On the one side, India wants to protect state sovereignty. 
State sovereignty is seen as established basic needs under international law. While on the 
other side, India has also ratified the human right treaties and hence have committed to live 
up to them. The combination is difficult because when human rights are affecting state 
sovereignty, they are truly challenging state affairs (Willetts 2011: 69).  
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1.4.4 The challenge of democracy and election  
Modern democracy gives its citizens rights (Benhabib 2006: 32). Seyla Benahbib believe we, 
since the UN Human Rights were created in 1948, has gained cosmopolitan norms, unlike 
previously when they were international (Ibid: 15-16). While international laws and 
regulations refer to states and organisations, cosmopolitan laws and regulations refer to the 
individual (Ibid: 16). Because human rights have an universalistic moral standpoint, they 
include all mankind, not just those within certain limits (Ibid: 18). The question is how the 
democratic majority may be reconciled with cosmopolitan norms. This highlights what 
Benhabib calls “the democratic legitimacy paradox”. This means that while human rights are 
supposed to be universal, democracy has a distinction between members and that of outside 
(Ibid: 17). Hence, moral obligations and bonds you have as a member within a given 
community, and the ones you have as a human being, may create tension (Ibid: 18-19).  
Ideally, the members of the sovereign democratic body should be “respected as bearers of 
human rights” (Benhabib 2006: 32). Benhabib writes that “the consociates of this sovereign 
freely associate with one another to establish a regime of self-governance under which each is 
to be considered both author of the laws and subjected to them”  (Ibid: 32). The relationship 
between the universal human rights and cultural/national identity is crucial for democratic 
legitimacy, as democracy forms the universal principles in society. However, a democratic 
government, their interpretations and the actual law may contradict each other (Ibid: 32). 
Where such a conflicts exist, there maintains certain restrictions due to one’s interpretations 
of rights. The paradox is that even legitimisation is a form of self constitution. Democracy 
defines itself territorially (Ibid: 33). One is therefore defined on the basis of the limits with 
those criteria’s (Ibid: 34). A nation promises to uphold human rights while a democracy must 
follow the majority vote. These may contradict each other (Ibid: 35).  
In 2014, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won the election in India. BJP is a right-wing Hindu 
nationalist party with an aggressive rhetoric towards Hindu culture. The Muslim minority has 
previously been highlighted as the “enemy”. (NUPI N.d. (a)). In 1992, BJP urged people to 
tear down the Babri Mosque, claiming it was built on the site of an ancient Hindu temple. 
(Nussbaum 2007: 17). Unfortunately, this is only one of several examples of their abuse 
towards Indian minorities. Having the Indian population voting for BJP, despite its treatment 
towards minorities, pinpoint the challenges of democracy and human rights on the one side 
and the majority vote on the other.  
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1.4.5. Problem statement  
Four factors regarding India and caste were mentioned above: 
1. India’s view on caste and discrimination:  
The Indian government is claiming that caste discrimination is not included in the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (Jones 
07.02.2014). 
2. International Dalit Solidarity Network’s (IDSN’s) application to the Economic and  
Social Council (ECOSOC): 
India’s current power position in The Committee on NGOs, hinders IDSN from being 
granted consultative status in the UN (IDSN 29.10.2014).  
3. The challenge of human rights and state sovereignty: 
Human rights on the one side, and state sovereignty on the other (Willetts 2011: 69). 
4. The challenge of democracy and election:  
India promises to uphold human rights, while a democracy must follow the majority 
vote (Benhabib 2006: 35).  
Caste may be interpreted to violate the UN Human Rights. On the one hand, the UN Human 
Rights highlights equality while trying to eliminate discrimination. On the other hand, the UN 
Human Rights promote freedom of religion. These are conflicting interests (Nöhrlind 
17.11.2014). The topic of caste in India is important as it sheds light on a powerful state 
protecting a human rights issue. Theory and practise seems to be segregated in India. It is 
disturbing that India so far has been able to control the agenda setting of caste. Against the 
background of this problem statement, the research question is: why, and how, is India 
protecting the caste system at the national and international arena?  
At the national level, I will look at the two main political parties in India: the Indian National 
Congress (INC) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). I will study their view of national identity 
and whether caste is significant in that respect. At the international level the assignment will 
take a closer look at the NGO-UN relationship. I would like to see how NGOs and India 
operate regarding caste within the UN. Finally, I will apply the analysis of the national level 
to explain India’s actions at the international level. The key analytical concepts employed in 
this study refer to theories which will be elaborated in chapter 2. The concepts are function 
system, glocalisation, national identity, and transnational advocacy network.   
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1.5 Delimitation   
The study treats the period from 1947 to 2014. In 1947 India got their independence. India 
and Pakistan were further partitioned. When India was liberated from the British colonial 
rule, the Indian modern nation state was created. (Jacobsen 2010: 36-37). Descriptions 
mentioned before 1947 will therefore function primarily as background information. The 
timeframe is set to 2014 due to India’s last election the very same year. The interview with 
Executive Director of International Dalit Solidarity Network, Rikke Nöhrlind, was 
furthermore performed that year. This long time period is seen as necessary in order to give a 
clear picture for  the discursive analysis. 
At the national level, the two Indian political parties, the Indian National Congress (INC) and 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), are the focus of the study. The choice of these parties is due to 
their different background and ideology. This will be clearly stated in the description of the 
parties. By contrasting the two parties, it will be easier to show the scope and significance of 
India’s understanding of caste.  
The study will not consider regional differences within India. However, two significant 
events, in Amritsar and Gujarat, are described due to the involvement of two, former and 
current, Indian presidents. These event also describes the parties’ view on Hinduism and 
caste. By focusing on these political parties’ positions and development, as well as a general 
reference to electoral politics, I will be able to study and find differences between the parties. 
I have tried to avoid using INC’s and BJP’s own websites as sources in this study. Only one 
source from BJP’s webpage is used regarding merits. It is considered more interesting to look 
at what the parties actually do and have done, than what they say themselves. Rather, the 
parties’ caste policy will be studied through primary and secondary sources. Most important 
are the events where the parties are directly involved, emphasising on their practice. The 
reason behind this choice is further justified by the large numbers of sources found 
elsewhere: Christophe Jaffrelot (2003), Dag Erik Berg (2011), Divya Vaid and Anthony 
Heath (2010), Joti Sekhon (2000), K. Raman Pillai (1990), Knut A. Jacobsen (2006; 2010), 
Lars Tore Flåten (2012), Martha C. Nussbaum (2007), Ministry of Law and Justice 
(29.07.2008), Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI), Oliver Heath and Yogendra Yadav 
(2010), Om P. Gautam (1990), Peter Beyer (2006), Phul Chand and Raja J. Singh (1990), 
Ram Chandra Prasad (2009), Ranbir Vohra (2013), Roger Jeffery and Anthony F. Heath 
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(2010), Rowena Robinson (2012), Sirpa Tenhunen and Minna Säävälä (2012), Sunder Singh 
Bhandari (1990), Thomas Blom Hansen (1999) and Zoya Hasan (2010). 
The international level looks at NGOs’ and India’s role within the UN. The study is limited 
by looking at one particular NGO. International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) was chosen 
because it is a caste related NGO. Further, with its lack of the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) status and their pending application, I found it interesting and relevant to examine 
India’s position regarding this issue. 
IDSN was founded in Copenhagen (Denmark) March 2000 (IDSN N.d a: 44). It is a NGO 
which does not have an affiliation with any political party (IDSN N.d. c) IDSN is an 
international network made up by national platforms and Dalit Solidarity Networks. In 
addition, they cooperate with national and international associates (IDSN N.d a: 44). IDSN 
wants: “full recognition of caste discrimination as one of the most serious and most important 
human rights issues in the world” (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014). IDSN desire necessary instruments 
in the UN dealing with: frameworks and guidance tools to further enhance their rights. In the 
long run, they also want a convention and a mechanism monitoring the application process. 
Prior to IDSN existence, only one UN document from 1996 existed regarding this subject. 
There was a lack of research on the topic. According to Executive Director of IDSN, Rikke 
Nöhrlind, caste was ignored. It was not mentioned in any documents (Ibid 17.11.2014). This 
emphasises the importance of IDSN’s work and underpins the choice of this particular NGO.  
Due to the focus of IDSN at the international level, the UN will only be studied with 
reference to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). As mentioned, this status is the 
only framework giving NGOs participation rights within the UN (UN 2011: 2). 
 
1.6 Method 
This research relies on qualitative research methods. However, I am analysing the problem 
statement from both a national (micro) and international (macro) level, using both a deductive 
and inductive approach. The method at the national and international level will be presented 
separately below. Methodology consists mainly of two factors. It describes which sources one 
utilises and how they are collected, and lastly how the data is analysed. The national and 
international level will hence further be divided between these two factors.  
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1.6.1 Method at the national level 
1.6.1.1 Sources and collection  
Texts serve three purposes in qualitative research: “they present 1. the essential data on which 
findings are based; 2. the basis of interpretations; and 3. the central medium for presenting 
and communicating findings”. This being said, there is no one-to-one relationship between 
the social realities and texts’ representations (Flick 2014: 95). Nevertheless, theoretical 
existing literature have been used in this study. It is seen as necessary in order to find out 
what is already known about the issue, what has and has not been studied, and to see which 
questions remains unanswered (Ibid: 66-67). 
The sources used at the national level are related to Hinduism, casteism, human rights, 
politics and political parties. The sources which have been used are books, reports, letters and 
theories. Anthony D. Smith (2003), Arvind Sharma (2004), C.J. Fuller (2004), Gavin Flood 
(1996), Joti Sekhon (2000), Knut A. Jacobsen (2006; 2010), Peter Beyer (2006), Rowena 
Robinson (2012) and Sebastian Velassery (2005) contribute with good background 
information on Hinduism and caste. They further describe what caste is and how it 
developed.  
Christophe Jaffrelot (2003), Divya Vaid and Anthony Heath (2010), James Manor (2010), K. 
Raman Pillai (1990), Lars Tore Flåten (2012), Martha C. Nussbaum (2007), Norsk 
Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI), Om P. Gautam (1990), Peter van der Veer (2005), Phul 
Chand and Raja J. Singh (1990), Ram Chandra Prasad (2009), Ranbir Vohra (2013), Roger 
Jeffery and Anthony F. Heath (2010), Sirpa Tenhunen and Minna Säävälä (2012), Sunder 
Singh Bhandari (1990) and Thomas Blom Hansen (1999) writes about the political parties 
which are in focus of this assignment, as well as their politics and policies.   
Lastly, theories developed by Anthony D. Smith (2003) and Peter Beyer (2006) have been 
used. The choice behind these theories will be further embellished below in the next chapter. 
The national level is further loosely based on previous unpublished material. (Gravaas 2013: 
unpublished materials). 
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1.6.1.2 Data analyses  
The method at the national level has a deductive approach. This means that the research is 
conducted out of the theory (Bryman 2012: 711). Deductive research explores a known 
theory and tests the theory’s validity in a given circumstance. “The reasoning starts with a 
theory and leads to a new hypothesis. This hypothesis is put to the test by confronting it with 
observations that either lead to a confirmation or a rejection of the hypothesis” (Snieder 2009: 
16).  
The conducted theory at this level is mainly Anthony D. Smith’s theory of religion and 
national identity, along Peter Beyer’s theory of function systems. The problem statement will 
be answered, at the national level, by looking at what the political parties, Indian National 
Congress (INC) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), consider to be national identity. Further, 
the research will try to find whether caste is included in the parties’ view of national identity. 
The parties’ view of national identity is important as my hypothesis is that their answer is 
interlinked with the problem statement. My hypothesis is that it is the parties’ connection to 
caste that protects the topic at the national and international arena.  
The contrast between the parties, will show the scope in India’s understanding of national 
identity. The parties’ history and development will further give an impression of how the 
voters’ perception of national identity has evolved. By analysing the transnational 
participants’ perception of national identity, the religious effect on the parties will further 
become apparent. 
 
1.6.2 Method at the international level 
1.6.2.1 Sources and collection  
Mainly two methods have been used in this part of the study: 1. the collection of texts and 
documents, and 2. qualitative interviewing (Bryman 2012: 383).  
Sources used at the international level are related to Hinduism and casteism from a human 
rights point of view, the United Nations and non-governmental organisations. Arvind Sharma 
(2004), Christophe Jaffrelot (2003), Dag Erik Berg (2011), Heiner Bielefeldt (2000), Keck 
and Sikkink (1998), Martha C. Nussbaum (2007), Sebastian Velassery (2005), Seyla 
Benhabib (2006), Smita Narula (1999), W. J. Basil Fernando (2002) and Zoya Hasan (2010) 
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have written about the challenge of casteism and human rights. These researchers along with 
Helena Cook (1996), Knut A. Jacobsen (2003; 2010), Peter Willetts (2011), and the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (24.05.1948) also focus on the challenge of state 
sovereignty versus human rights. These latter sources have also been used at the national 
level, but the focus of human rights is mainly placed at the international level given that 
human rights are an international issue placed at the national level.  
Kerstin Martens (2005) and Peter Wiletts (1996; 2011), among others, have written about the 
UN and NGO relationship. Reports and letters developed by Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Assembly and Association: Maina Kiai, Ministry of Law and Justice (01.09.2014), Martha 
Finnmore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) and the United Nations (2011; 24.05.1948) have been 
used additionally to describe this relationship.  
At the international level, caste is studied at a UN level through NGO participation. As 
mentioned, I chose to focus on a NGO named International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN). 
IDSN was singled out on the bases of its background, being a significant contributor in trying 
to front low castes on both the national and international arena. IDSN’s lack of consultative 
status and their pending application further increased its relevance.  
IDSN does not have consultative status within ECOSOC. What consequences does this have? 
Why is IDSN unable to gain accreditation? Are some subjects more applicable, making  it 
easier to get recognition? Is it easier for a NGO gaining recognition when working on 
discrimination? These questions must be answered in order to find India’s role in this 
situation. Executive Director of IDSN, Rikke Nöhrlind, was contacted in order to gain the 
adequate information.  
A purposive sampling have been used by getting in contact with someone with direct 
reference to the research question. More precisely, this is an extreme (or deviant) case 
sampling, which is a type of purposive sampling used to focus on a special or unusual case. 
This case is useful because it provides insights into a particular phenomenon. The fact that 
IDSN’s application have been pending for such a long time, make this case highly unusual. 
(Lærd Dissertation N.d.). Consequently, it is a non-probability sampling, focusing on 
particular characteristics of the case in interest. (Bryman 2012: 416). Information at the 
international level was collected through an interview with Rikke Nöhrlind, the Executive 
14 
 
Director of IDSN. Additional sources here are the IDSN’s homepage along documents and 
letters written by the organisation.  
Nöhrlind was approached in order to do an expert sampling, due to the uncertainty and lack 
of empirical evidence, and to highlight potentially new information on the area. The study at 
the international (macro) level is built on parts of my previous unpublished materials on 
IDSN (Gravaas 2014: unpublished materials). The interview was performed November 17th 
2014 for an examination project, but was performed with the intention of using it further in 
this master’s thesis.  
The interview was performed on Skype. Nöhrlind was situated in Denmark (Copenhagen). I 
was situated in Norway (Trondheim). With Nöhrlind’s consent, I used my mobile telephone 
to record the meeting. The interview was transcribed the subsequent days (Matthews 2010: 
226). The interview guide is included in the appendix.  
Nöhrlind had asked me, by e-mail, if I could send her the questions of the interview in 
beforehand. I agreed to this and sent them to her a couple of weeks prior to the interview. The 
interview started with introductory questions about IDSN, followed by questions regarding 
religion, national identity, UN interaction, subjects of implementation within the UN and 
questions regarding power.  
I choose a qualitative semi-structured interview, asking questions in a specific order. Specific 
topics were covered, mainly regarding the organisation’s current consultative status 
application. This type of interview was preferred because of its flexibility. (Matthews 2010: 
226). Since the study would not compare numerous NGOs, Nöhrlind was given the 
opportunity to answer with her own words. This approach gave her the chance to come with 
added information and inputs throughout the interview. (Ibid: 221). Nöhrlind was asked in 
the end of the interview whether she had any additional comments, in which she took the 
opportunity to elaborate.   
The most important theory at the international level is Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink's Transnational Advocacy Network (1998). The choice behind the theory will be 
further embellished below in the next chapter.  
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1.6.2.2 Data analyses  
The method at the international level is a result of an analytic induction, starting out with 
observations, findings, a problem statement and a hypothesis, before collecting the data. The 
research becomes the outcome (Bryman 2012: 566). In short, inductive analyse is an 
instrument which may be used in a particular case where one wants to “analyse the 
exception” (Flick 2014: 497). One starts by analysing the deviant case, giving a definition of 
the phenomenon before presenting a hypothesis which may explain the outcome (Ibid: 497). 
My hypothesis is that it is the parties’ connection to caste that protects the topic at the 
national and international arena. Analytic induction is a strict method of analysis. In case of 
inconsistency, the hypothesis either  needs to be reformulated or the researcher needs to 
collect further data (Bryman 2012: 567).  
As mentioned, this part of the study generates theory based on the research. The study at the 
international level has an epistemological position in that the social world is seen through its 
participants. In this case the “participant” is IDSN, as most of the study has been based on the 
experience of IDSN and the interview with Executive Director of IDSN, Rikke Nöhrlind. 
Further, the study has an ontological position, implying that the outcomes are the results of 
the interaction between individuals (Bryman 2012: 380). More precisely, this highlights the 
suspicion of my hypothesis: that it is the parties’ connection to caste that protects the topic at 
the national and international arena.  
 
1.6.3 Reliability and validity  
In every study it is important to question the reliability and validity. The concepts are 
important when determining whether the study is trustworthy. Reliability is the “degree to 
which a measure of a concept is stable” (Bryman 2012: 715). Reliability is concerned with 
whether the study may easily be replicated. Validity is “concerned with the integrity of the 
conclusions that are generated from a piece of research”. (Ibid: 717).  In other words, validity 
is concerned whether the researcher is observing, measuring and identifying what she says 
she is, and whether the conclusions are right (Ibid: 389-390).  
This study can easily be replicated. Its external reliability is high as all of the texts and 
documents are documented in the bibliography. Further, the interview was not anonymous. 
The study is based on an interview with the Executive Director of IDSN, Rikke Nöhrlind, 
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who had direct reference to the research questions (Bryman 2012: 416). As I am the only 
researcher in this study, the internal reliability should also be good (Ibid: 390). 
The internal validity seems clear as the observations made, both at the national and 
international level, are cross-checked by each other (Bryman 2012: 390). The observations 
made in the interview, and by Nöhrlind herself, seem very much to correspond to other 
sources used throughout. The same may be said about the observations made at the national 
level. Though it might be noted that although some researchers agrees with the relation 
between caste and national identity, not all seem to agree there is a problem.  
It is the external validity which might be the weakest in this assignment, referring to the 
degree to which the results can be generalised to other settings (Bryman 2012: 390). Since 
part of the study is the employment of a case study, and the area is limited to India alone, it is 
indeed difficult to generalise. But the intention has neither been to do so. The study focus on  
this particular case being studied, describing and emphasising on the context (Ibid: 399-401). 
 
1.6.4 Method in short  
To sum up, the assignment is divided into two parts, the national and the international level.  
The national level uses Anthony D. Smith’s theory of religion and national identity, looking 
at what the Indian political parties, BJP and INC, considers to be national identity, and 
whether caste is included in their view of it. 
The international level focuses on the current situation of IDSN, using the interview of Rikke 
Nöhrlind. IDSN is studied through Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s theory of 
Transnational Advocacy Network (1998).  
All in all this is a maximum variation sampling (also known as heterogeneous sampling), 
trying to capture different perspectives relating to the problem statement. This study focus on 
the current situation of IDSN and their ECOSOC application, and the two political parties 
BJP and INC. The attempt has been to gain greater insights into the problem statement by 
looking at it from all angles, identifying common themes across the sample. (Lærd 
Dissertation N.d.). 
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1.7 Outline  
Chapter two elaborates the theories, relating them to the problem statement. I start with the 
theory of Peter Beyer (function systems), seeing religion and law as different function 
systems at the national and international levels. Ronald Robertson’s theory of glocalisation 
is further used to analyse relations between the two levels. Anthony D. Smith’s theory of 
religion and national identity is used to explain the parties’ views on national identity. 
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s theory called Transnational Advocacy Networks, 
show how NGOs can influence and put pressure on states by cooperating with 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). Their theory will be implemented to IDSN’s 
situation trying to get recognised in the UN. Lastly, a summary will connect the different 
theories together. 
Chapter three starts by describing and elaborating the term of caste. A historical 
representation of the two Indian political parties, INC and BJP follows. The political parties 
view of national identity will be studied with the help of Anthony D. Smith’s theory of 
national identity. The choice of these parties is due to their different background and 
ideology. Finally, a historical presentation of the electoral votes of the Indian people are 
presented, showing the development of Indian politics while relating it to caste.  
Chapter four looks at the international level, seeing how the topic of caste is treated at the 
UN-level seen from a NGO-standpoint. First there will be a discussion regarding the use of 
terminology in the UN. What the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is, and its 
importance is further described before looking at IDSN’ consultative status application. 
Human rights and state sovereignty, at times, have different missions (Willetts 2011: 69). 
This needs to be discussed further and will be elaborated under 4.4. Lastly, future thoughts 
about IDSN and their application are mentioned.  
Chapter five is an analysis, intertwining the national and international level, seeing how the 
two interact and whether they have an impact on the other. Ronald Robertson’s theory of 
glocalisation is highly relevant here.  
Lastly, chapter six gives a conclusion where the most important findings in the study are 
presented.  
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2.0 Theory  
This study is drawn on the theories of several researchers. However, the most central are: 
Peter Beyer, Ronald Robertson, Anthony D. Smith, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. 
Their theories, and their utility to caste, will be described below.  
 
2.1 Function systems 
Within the discipline of sociology, the term “society” is often applied to nation states, as a 
number of societies have been “more or less coterminous” with states (Beyer 2006: 20). 
Society at the national level may hence be seen as the micro level in this study. Peter Beyer 
believes society and social lives, all around the world, “are affected by the simultaneously 
globalizing and localizing processes (...) that the level of global integration of social world 
has increased to the point that we must speak about a single global society” (Ibid: 27). Global 
society, the international level, can thus be seen as the macro level in this study. 
Beyer sees societies as consisting of several different communication systems that the current 
global system would not have existed without. (Beyer 2006: 51). Beyer describes four types 
of societal systems: 1. functional, 2. stratified/ hierarchy, 3. segmentary and 4. core-periphery 
(Ibid: 37). Beyer believes the functional societal system, within global society, is more 
important than the other systems (Ibid: 39). The function systems are “major socio-structural 
features” which together have helped constitute today’s global society (Ibid: 41).  
The essence of function systems is important because it says something about the relationship 
within, and relationship to others. Caste is part of the Hindu religious function system. 
However, caste is also a stratified/ hierarchical societal system (Beyer 2006: 38-39). 
Stratified/ hierarchical societal system are asymmetrically structured, being unlike and 
dependent of each other at the same time (Ibid: 40). In the stratified societal system, the 
subsystems exists in the same place, prohibiting and limiting communication (Ibid: 38). 
Functional differentiation have a form of functional specialisation with divisions of labour. In 
stratified societies such as India, the division of labour, such as the economic and political, is 
assigned to a particular stratum (Ibid: 39). There is friction between caste as a hierarchical 
societal system and the function system of law and human rights, which states that everyone 
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has equal rights. Within castes, people are “ranked” differently and hence does not have the 
same rights (Ibid: 38-39).  
As this study also deals with a caste related non-governmental organisation (NGO), Beyer’s 
description of NGOs at a macro level should be mentioned. Organisations are not limited to 
their role within certain function systems (Beyer 2006: 52). Organisation define themselves 
by differentiating members from non-members. They have different expectations for them 
which leads to a distinctive internal communication (Ibid: 51). Organisations have different 
perspectives and viewpoints. Further, organisations’ viewpoints may coincide or be divergent 
within a state (Ibid: 5). As caste, through religion, in itself is a form of communication 
system, India might not want other communication systems to interfere. As mentioned above, 
this is where the challenges of hierarchy versus the function system of law comes in. It is 
because of this that organisations tend to be problematic in some societies, such as IDSN is in 
India (Ibid: 52). 
An understanding of what the function systems are, and how they emerged, is important in 
understanding globalisation (Beyer 2006: 14). The function system of religion is, as any 
function systems, a social construction (Ibid: 3). Religion, or dharma, is often by Hindus 
viewed as an expansive term, accommodating to other South Asian religions such as Sikhism, 
Jainism and Buddhism (Ibid: 7). Beyer describes religion as an independent functional 
system that interacts with other functional systems (Ibid: 62). Although function systems are 
differentiated from each other, they are also interdependent. However, two systems cannot 
operate on the same primary code. Religion is therefore under pressure to build its own code, 
which differs from other systems (Ibid: 85).  
Beyer’s theory further seek to show how religion, as a function system, (in this case 
Hinduism) was constructed by the Western powers. Beyer’s theory contributes greatly in 
attempting to solve, and answer, the problem statement. While discussing the parties 
connection to caste, Beyer’s theory help explain how the construction of Hinduism was 
“created.”  
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2.2 Glocalisation   
Ronald Robertson say globalisation can be expressed through three logical moments: “1. the 
spread of various particular social forms across the globe”. These forms “2. become 
particularised to various other local situations”. Such a transformation “can become the 
particular subject of 3. another universalisation, which in turn become reparticularised in 
other contexts and other times” (Beyer 2006: 24). Robertson utilises this definition of 
globalisation in order to coin his famous term glocalisation. He believes there is a tendency 
to understand globalisation in terms of “analytic binaries, especially the spatial distinction 
between the global and the local” (Beyer N.d. 98). Robertson believes the local is 
intrinsically connected with the global. The one expresses itself in the other. Hence, 
globalisation has also become glocalisation (Ibid 98). As societies of the world globalise, 
they increasingly have more in common. But this homogenisation also generates 
heterogeneity in that people are doing things differently (Beyer 2006: 26). Robertson’s theory 
is the reason for why this study focuses on both the national and international level when 
analysing caste and Indian politics. National issues have become international issues, and 
vice versa. In a globalised world where people and their views on the world are continuously 
intertwined, there is an increasing belief in equality for all, creating tension towards caste.  
Robertson further describes the complexity of inclusion within society. A key dimension of 
globalisation is the rights of individuals “with the increasing power of distinctly impersonal 
societal system” (Beyer 2006: 54). This highlights Beyer’s point regarding hierarchy versus 
functional systems (Ibid: 38-39). In order to be included in society, one need access to the 
power in a system where people “do not operate in terms of belonging”. Systems operate, and 
must operate, asymmetrically due to the distribution of their power. Examples may be 
capitalism’s dependence on inequalities of wealth and government’s political power in 
decision-making. These structural features increases the importance of one’s status and 
responsibility in society (Ibid: 54). Identity is affected both by individuals and groups. 
Differences are therefore seen as both an individual and group affair (Ibid: 55). Due to the 
systems’ asymmetric power distribution, individuals’ responsibility increases. Robertson’s 
statements can be interpreted as the Brᾱhmaṇas’, i.e. the high caste’s, increasing 
responsibility towards Dalits (people ranked outside the caste system). As the world has 
become glocalised, the responsibility for Dalits has further become international as well as 
national, placing the responsibility on everyone.    
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2.3 National identity  
National identity is by Anthony D. Smith defined as:  
 The maintenance and continual reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths, 
 and traditions that form the distinctive heritage of the nation, and the identification of individuals with 
 that heritage and its pattern  (Smith 2003: 24-25).  
Smith emphasises that national identity is under constant change. Externally, it changes 
territorially and politically. Internally it is maintained through tradition and norms. The 
nation’s main resources can be said to be ethnicity and religion, as they often are seen in 
conjunction with each other (Smith 2003: 25).  
Smith believes religion is the very essence of national identities (Smith 2003: 29). He 
describes three levels of analysis regarding these identities: the official, the popular, and the 
underlying level. The official level look at national identity in the public through official 
doctrines, laws and rituals (Ibid: 28). It is the national goals, doctrines and the official 
versions that are taught at school. The popular level focuses on religious beliefs and national 
ideals, as well as what people underpin their ideas with (Ibid: 29). Smith call the underlying 
level for “sacred foundations” (Ibid: 31). It considers items such as memories, myths, 
symbols and values that the nation considers to be “holy”. The underlying dimensions are: 
history, territory, community, and destiny (Ibid: 31). Smith writes about “a sacred 
communion of the people” where the nation has a psychological bond that binds them 
together (Ibid: 32). Smith’s point is: where a community of believers coincide with ethnicity, 
the community is reinforced by making it into “a holy congregation” (Ibid: 33).  
Smith has applied his theory primarily to the West. His hope is that his theory might also be 
valuable and adaptable to other parts of the world, such as the religious and cultural traditions 
in the East (Smith 2003: 7). His theory is important as it may advance the understanding of 
India’s view of national identity. As mentioned above, my hypothesis states that the parties’ 
connection to caste, and their view of it as intrinsic to the Indian national identity, protects the 
topic at the national and international arena.  
Smith’s theory will be used by looking at how the two parties, Indian National Congress 
(INC) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), view national identity, particularly related to caste. 
With reference to Smith’s three levels, I will explore the parties’ goals, doctrines and national 
ideals, seeing what their thoughts regarding national identity are.  
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2.4 Transnational Advocacy Network 
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink defines Transnational Advocacy Networks as 
follows:  
 A transnational advocacy network includes those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, 
 who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information 
 and services. Activists in networks try not only to influence policy outcomes, but to transform the 
 terms and nature of the debate (Keck 1998: 2).  
Transnational Advocacy Network is a theory, which coincides with IDSN’s way of working. 
The purpose is to affect extraneous affairs. It may consist of different groups and movements, 
coming from different religions and nationalities, working towards a common goal. Often this 
regards common grounds such as vulnerability issues, or more specific human rights (Keck 
1998: 9-10). They may cooperate with a third party, more specific: a strong actor, in order to 
gain or exchange information for example regarding accountability politics (Ibid: 16).  
Commonly, transnational networks emerge when: 
1. Contact between a group and their state is blocked. 
2. There is reason to believe that networking will advance their work.  
3. Common arenas of communication occur (Keck 1998: 12).  
The CERD rapport, mentioned above, indicates that India is not acknowledging caste as 
discrimination. (Jones 07.02.2014). IDSN is a clear example of such a transnational network. 
1. The contact is blocked by India. This leads IDSN to find alternative ways to put caste 
discrimination on the international agenda. 2. Transnational networks emerge when it is 
probable that networking will give progress (Keck 1998: 9-12). Because the communication 
is blocked, IDSN needs to bypass India. 3. The work of networks may be powerful. By 
putting a policy on the agenda one can influence a state or different international 
organisations. This may result in changing political behaviour (Ibid: 25). IDSN wants to 
address the caste issue on the world stage. The intension is to raise awareness among the 
public. This might affect national and international norms in the long run (Martens 2005: 15).  
Keck and Sikkink’s theory of the boomerang effect explains an alternate way for NGOs to 
have an impact on a state when the communication is blocked (Martens 2005: 14). Within the 
boomerang effect, networks may bypass state blockages by cooperating with international 
allies, pressuring the initial state (Ibid: 5; Ibid: 14). The purpose is to speed up the process in 
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order to reach their goal. For example: citizens, or a group, in one country can influence 
people in other countries through networks (Keck 1998: 12).  
Since 2008, IDSN has searched for such an ally within the UN. Human right treaties and 
other NGOs, has together with IDSN created a Transnational Advocacy Network. The intent 
is to put pressure on India. The UN machinery has thus a central role in making a 
Transnational Advocacy Network functional. IDSN is working actively towards the UN and 
others whose focus is caste.  
Maina Kiai, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of 
Association, submitted a report in 2014. Kiai stated the importance of states responsibility 
towards human rights and its obligation to protect its inhabitants. When a state becomes a 
member of a multilateral organisation, the citizens have the full right to engage in the issues 
the organisation is working with (Kiai 01.09.2014: 14). In the example above, we have seen 
that India refuse responsibility above caste issue. IDSN takes responsibility. Non-state actors 
have, during the last couple of years, demanded inclusion within the state-centric governance. 
According to Kiai, they want greater focus on human rights and human welfare within 
multilateral work. It is important that the variety of opinions is heard (Ibid: 4).  
Keck and Sikkink focus on the impact of network on governments. But according to Peter 
Willetts, the researchers focus little on the effect advocacy has on IGOs. Willetts criticises the 
two for focusing mainly on human rights, as human rights ultimately are the responsibility 
and the choice of the states (Willetts 2011: 132).  The research in this study tests Willett’s 
statements. It becomes clear that the UN “machinery” empowers NGOs through creating 
Transnational Advocacy Networks. IDSN has yet not been accredited ECOSOC status and is 
thereby hindered access in the UN “machinery” (Willetts 1996: 43).  
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2.5 Summary 
Before utilising the theories in practice, here is a short summary repeating the different 
theories and their relevance to the topic of caste.  
Peter Beyer’s function systems describes the relationship within, and relationship to others. 
Caste is part of the religious function system, while also being a stratified/ hierarchical 
societal system. There is friction between caste as a hierarchical societal system and the 
function system of law and human rights, which states that everyone has rights. Within 
castes, people are ranked differently, having alternate rights (Beyer 2006: 38-39). The close 
connection between the two societal systems creates tension.  
Beyer further explains the uniqueness of organisations in global society in that they constitute 
themselves by distinguishing between members and non-members, crossing borders (Beyer 
2006: 51). In some instances this may be problematic, such as IDSN in India (Ibid: 52). His 
theory further contributes towards explaining how the construction of Hinduism was 
“created”, while discussing the parties’ connection to caste. 
Ronald Robertson’s glocalisation believes local conditions accommodate the global, as the 
one expresses itself in the other (Beyer 2006: 98). The societies of the globalised world 
continuously have more in common, in  the same time as the homogenisation also generates 
heterogeneity, as people do things differently (Ibid: 26). Glocalisation is the glue which binds 
the national with the international in this assignment, seeing whether a glocalisation is 
traceable.  
For Anthony D. Smith religion is the essence of national identities (Smith 2003: 29). His 
three ways of analysis is valuable. Here is a short sum up:  
1. The official level look at national identity through official doctrines, laws and rituals, 
as opposed to people’s everyday practice (Ibid: 28).  
2. The popular level focuses on religious beliefs, national ideals, and what people 
underpins their ideas with (Ibid: 29).  
3. The underlying level  considers memories, myths, symbols and values that the nation 
considers to be “holy” (Ibid: 31). 
Smith’s theory is important because, by looking at INC and BJP, it may help understand the 
parties’ view of national identity and the significance that caste has in this respect.  
25 
 
When challenges occur within a state, transnational networks will appear in order to provide 
assistance to advocacy networks (Keck 1998: 9-12). In this way, networks may be powerful. 
They can influence behaviour and make change happen (Ibid: 25). Keck and Sikkink’s theory 
of the boomerang effect explains an alternate way for NGOs to have an impact on a state 
when the communication is blocked (Martens 2005: 14). Within the boomerang effect, 
Transnational Advocacy Networks may bypass state blockages by cooperating with 
international allies, pressuring the initial state (Ibid: 5; Ibid: 14). Their theory is important in 
the analysis at the international level, looking into IDSN’s current consultative status 
application to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).  
The theories mentioned above are intertwined on the bases of caste and religion. Together 
they analyse what people underpin their believes with, explains the friction between caste and 
human rights, and how NGOs may bypass their state in order to get their policy heard, 
showing how the local expresses itself at the global arena as well as the other way around. 
The theories may be utilised on both the national (micro) level and the international (macro) 
level, while explaining how the process of caste is interlinked on both levels. Further, these 
theories explains different sides of the same coin, or rather different pieces of the same 
puzzle, giving a fuller picture of the caste issue. 
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3.0 The national level 
The national level is loosely based on previous unpublished material. (Gravaas 2013: 
unpublished materials). This chapter will start by giving a short historical introduction to the 
time prior to 1947. The term caste will be explained thereafter. A historical representation of 
Indian National Congress (INC) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) follows, before studying 
how the two political parties view national identity. Next, a historical presentation of the 
electoral votes of the Indian people are presented, showing the development of Indian politics 
while relating it to caste. Finally, the chapter will be concluded with a summary.  
Before the British colonial rule, the Indian subcontinent was controlled by Muslims. Islam 
started its impact already around 1000 AD. The subcontinent consisted of hundreds of states. 
Through 1556-1605, the area was characterised by the Mughal unification. By circa 1600 the 
first real European impact arrived. (Hauss 2012: 328). Between 1707-1857 the Indian 
subcontinent was characterised by strives of power and the establishment of the British 
supremacy. In 1858 India became a part of the British empire. This is the time of the origin, 
and the emergence, of national identity, which will be described more thoroughly later in this 
chapter. In 1947 India got their independence and India-Pakistan was partitioned. There was 
a need to create a modern nation state which responded to the liberation from the colonial 
rule. It is in this context that India became a modern national state and that India’s modern 
national identity was constructed (Jacobsen 2010: 36-37). Caste was an important factor in 
this construction.  
 
3.1 Caste  
It is necessary to define and describe the complexity of caste before writing about the subject. 
Caste is a hierarchical system, distinguishing peoples’ status by determining one’s purity and 
pollution (Flood 1996: 58).  
The Aryans developed a social system in today’s India called varṇāśramadharma, about 
1500 AD (Velassery 2005: 2). The Veda is a gathering of hymns most Hindus find to be 
authoritative.  (Fuller 2004: 12). The upper classes was the only ones allowed to hear and 
learn the Veda (Flood 1996: 58-59). The art of writing first arrived on the subcontinent about 
300 AD (Jacobsen 2010: 49). Pedagogical methods were therefore developed specifically for 
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oral tradition (Jacobsen 2003: 49). The oldest part of the Vedas is called ṚgVeda. The earliest 
description of caste is found here in ṚgVeda; Purusha Sukta (Velassery 2005: 3). This is 
where the varṇās, the four classes, are portrayed (Fuller 2004: 12). 
Varṇāśramadharma consists of several concepts. Varṇā represent class, āśrama: one’s stage 
in life, and dharma: one’s duties. Thus, Varṇā (the social class) and āśrama (ones stage in 
life) determines one’s dharma (duties) (Flood 1996: 58).  
As mentioned, each class has their own obligations and rights, their own dharma (Jacobsen 
2010: 22). The varṇā ideology is defined by each class having different tasks. The intention 
is to maintain world order. Traditionally, there are four classes (varṇās) which is ranked from 
top to bottom. 1. On top were the intellectuals, teachers and priests, called the Brᾱhmaṇas. 
The priests’ tasks was to convey the Veda. They further made sacrifices to the gods. 2. The 
Kṣatriyas were people within the police, as well as administrators and warriors. The warriors 
task was to protect the people. 3. The Vaiśyas were business people, which lent out money, 
and farmers, which cultivated land and animals. 4. The Śūdras were craftsmen who served 
the people in the other classes (Ibid: 83). 
There are four life stages (āśrama). 1. Brahmacārya: student life,  2. Gṛhastha: household 
life, 3. Vanaprastha: retired life, 4. Renounced life: an ascetic living in quest for moksa 
(liberation from samsara/ rebirth) (Flood 1996: 62).  
At first, one believed that the life stages within āśrama could be chosen at any time. The 
meaning of term āśrama has changed. It is now believed that the goals (puruṣārtha), must be 
done in a specific order: 1. Dharma is the fulfilment of duties and rituals in the community. 2. 
Artha is the achievement of political power and economic wealth. 3. Kama means erotic and 
aesthetic pleasure. 4. Moksa is the secession from rebirth (Jacobsen 2010: 85).  
At each life stage, a person achieves different goals. 1. Brahmacarya: dharma is achieved, 2. 
gṛhasta: dharma, artha and kama is accomplished, 3. vanaprastha: artha and kama is given 
up and the person retire, 4. saṃnyāsin: moksa (liberation from birth) is achieved. Salvation 
may only be achieved as an ascetic or monk (Jacobsen 2010: 85).  
Caste is a intricate term. When the Portuguese first arrived, during the 16th century, they tried 
to describe the population by dividing them into different clans and tribes. The term has stuck 
with them. Caste covers two terms, or concepts, named jᾱti and varṇā (Sharma 2004: 50). 
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Due to their description in philosophical texts, the relation between the two remains unclear. 
However, traditionally it seems as caste came from varṇā (Flood 1996: 60). Varṇā, 
mentioned previously, is the classes within Vedic society. Jᾱti point to the groups in Hindu 
society named “castes“. Within the cast hierarchy the Brᾱhmaṇas are ranked on top and the 
“untouchables” (which Mahatma Gandhi called the Harijans, later referred to as Dalits) are 
ranked last, outside the system. Caste is a hierarchical construction based on purity, where the 
upper caste, the Brᾱhmaṇas, are regarded as the “cleanest” (Ibid: 59).  
Peoples’ tasks have been maintained through the stability of the varṇā system (Flood 1996: 
60). Most probable, the varṇā  system is older than karma. When karma was incorporated, 
the hierarchy was strengthened in Hinduism. The term legitimates inequality. A persons 
congenital social status is believed to correlate with pervious actions (Jacobsen 2010: 84).  
The varṇā system is described by Christopher John Fuller as authoritative. It is a religious 
model within Hindu society, representing a hierarchal ranking of four classes with different 
responsibilities. Together they maintain and justifies the whole system (Fuller 2004: 12-13).  
Peter Beyer describes religion as an independent function system, interacting with other 
function systems (Beyer 2006: 62 f). Function systems are important as they says something 
about the relationship within and relationship to others (Ibid: 127). This may be found in the 
binary codes (Ibid: 43). Binary codes within function systems involves oppositional pairs. For 
religion the binary code is “blessed/ cursed” (Ibid: 85). “Programs, far from settling the issue 
of what constitutes the religions, are actually a name for their ongoing construction and 
therefore of the need constantly to reproduce them as religions” (Ibid: 90). The content within 
binary codes, as a religion defines itself within, will continuously be reinterpreted, and new 
interpretations are transferred into new contexts. This is how binary codes set guidelines for 
communication and function system (Ibid: 24).  
Hinduism is centred around mokṣa, which is the liberation from the continuous existence 
(samsāra) in which humans are a part of. That being said, Beyer does not expect people to 
achieve mokṣa in this life. The communicative structure is therefore rather centred around 
secondary codes as favorable/unfavorable and clean/unclean, rather than mokṣa/samsāra 
(Beyer 2006: 84). Thus the caste system is seen as one of the key elements in the religious 
function system.  
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Beyer describes Hinduism as a modern invented and imagined structure consisting of 
selective selections of different combinations (Beyer 2006: 188). This may be seen in context 
to Smith’s sacred foundation and the underlying level, which was mentioned above and will 
be discussed further below. The underlying level describes what people consider to be “holy” 
based on factors such as their history, community destiny and territory. Together these factors 
creates an idea of ancestry and what binds them together, making it imagined as well as real 
(Smith 2003: 31-33).  
Indian National Congress (INC) and Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) memories and 
interpretations of the past and present is continuously developed. The Hindu construction is 
further far from homogeneous. Not everyone who is considered to be Hindu practices 
Hinduism. Hinduism also seems to have had more than a religious significance. The 
distinction between the religion of Hinduism and Hindu as a cultural and national identity, 
therefore seems to be vague (Beyer 2006: 189).  
One can only wonder why the caste system was not abolished as the Indian population came 
in contact with other groups of people. When leaders justified their positions on the 
background of caste and karma, it was probably attractive to keep the system alive (Velassery 
2005: 3-4). Each caste had its position and rank defined from an ancient tradition (Ibid: 4).  
The end of the 1800’s is actually the beginning of what later came to be defined as 
“Hinduism”. Britain’s interpretation and imaginary construction of Hindu religion and culture 
lingers to this day. (Beyer 2006: 190). The capitalist economy, centralised state, legislation, 
education and mass media attracted the Indian elite. Organisations and movements that 
expressed their standpoint, was quickly propagated for, seen as a sign of their power. British 
generals eventually understood the importance of having knowledge of the local population, 
their language, culture and religion. This led to the creation of various institutions. (Ibid: 
191). Dependent on the Brᾱhmaṇas’, i.e. the high caste’s, who were those who were allowed 
to read the sacred books, India’s history was reconstructed by the British who favoured some 
models over others. (Ibid: 192). Hinduism is still, largely, a creature of the elite. Yet, 
incredibly, millions of people around the world define themselves in terms of this singular 
Hindu, illustrating the ambiguous relation between religion and culture.  (Ibid: 75).  
The European experience, meeting a wide variety of civilisations, played a crucial part in the 
idea of religion as a distinct and systematic domain. However, Beyer does not believe 
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Europeans possessed an understanding of religion which they imposed on the encountered. 
“It is rather that the confluence of intra-European developments with the global expansion of 
European influence provided the conditions for this re-imagining of the religious” (Beyer 
2006: 74). This correlates with the fact that the modern names for most of the religions did 
not appear in European literature until this process was well established. Developments by 
the Europeans only constitute one dimension of the global function system for religion (Ibid: 
74). Globalisation is in no way Western expansion. It is the creation of a new global culture, 
not the extension of one particular society. The spread of global culture is therefore as much 
happening at the “expense” of Western culture (Ibid: 9). A “dialogical understanding of 
globalisation”, creates a narrative presentation of the system which is also played by non-
Europeans of the world (Ibid: 74-75). This means that religion, in this case Hinduism, should 
not be seen as a static institution. The idea of religion constructed by the people and its 
environment, mean that religion is in continuous change. The framework of Hinduism is yet 
not determined. This is important to notice because it gives a positivistic view of caste in 
India, not seeing it as something immortal and unchangeable, nor having its future set.  
 
3.2 Historical presentation of the political parties 
The political parties investigated in this study are Indian National Congress (INC) and 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Below is a short presentation of the two.  
 
3.2.1 Indian National Congress (INC)  
Indian National Congress (INC) met for the first time on the 28th of December 1885 with the 
following  purpose:  
The eradication by direct friendly personal intercourse of all possible races, creed or provincial 
prejudice amongst lovers of our country and the fuller development and consolidation of those 
sentiments of national unity that had their origin in our beloved Lord Ripon’s ever memorable Reign 
(Chand 1990: 42).  
INC looked at both the British Empire and India’s own past in order to find its ideology 
(Prasad 2009: 62). Fighting “untouchability“ and poverty became two of their most essential 
objectives (Ibid: 63). Initially their reform was moderate. When radical nationalists took the 
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lead in 1916, the party became the main organ in India’s independence struggle. Later, with 
Mahatma Gandhi, INC got a hold of the masses and their goals was unified (SNL 31.05.2014 
(a)). INC became an umbrella party soughing to gather Indians across caste, ethnicity and 
religion. Under British colonialism, they stood as a unifying liberation front against the 
British rule (Chand 1990: 44). Mahatma Gandhi therefore suggested that the party should be 
discontinued after India’s independence (Bhandari 1990: 200). This did not happen due to 
some political leaders’ unwillingness to leave behind a political vacuum (Prasad 2009: 199).  
When India became independent in 1947, INC stood above challenges such as refugees, 600 
independent states, violence, food shortages, and social and economic problems. The party 
became the link that sought to unite the diverse nation (Chand 1990: 45). India’s 
independence show how India as a nation, despite its diversity, can stand together in 
situations under external threats (Ibid: 51). Rajiv Ghandi has said: 
With the Congress guiding, the country had come to a position of great strength…The Congress had 
always welcomed diversity in thinking and ideas coming in while not conforming to a monolithic unity 
type of structure. The party had traditionally bound the people together cutting across caste, religion, 
regions and languages (Ibid: 51).   
After independence, INC had to remodel itself again. The post-independent INC strove hard 
to establish its main goals which came to be secularism, democracy and social justice (Prasad 
2009: 63). INC dominated after Independence, with Jawaharal Nehru as leader from 1951 to 
1964 (SNL 31.05.2014 (a)). After Nehru’s death, the party was characterised by internal 
strives. As a compromise between the party’s right and left wing, Nehru’s daughter Indira 
Gandhi became Prime Minister of India (Ibid. 03.02.1015). In 1969, the strives lead to a split 
between Indira Gandhi and Morarji Desai (member in INC’s right wing). Desai’s grouping 
was later called Old Congress, or Organisation Congress, before he in 1977 joined the Janata 
alliance. Indira Gandhi gathered most votes from the more radical wing (Ibid. 31.05.2014 
(a)). During the election campaign of 1970, Indira Gandhi broke with the traditions of the old 
INC by presenting its politics directly to the voters, and “short-circuit the vote bank system” 
(Jaffrelot 2003: 117).  
After the internal contradictions, INC was able to sustain its democratic socialism  (Prasad 
2009: 69). Wanting to “abolish poverty” in 1971, INC would continue its ideals of socialism, 
secularism, and democracy, sweeping the polls (Prasad 2009: 74; Heath 2010: 196). 
However, in 1975 Indira Gandhi was charged for “having violated election law during the 
32 
 
campaign in 1971” (SNL 03.02.1015). Before it was treated by the Supreme Court, Indira 
Gandhi declared “state of emergency”. Further, she used the majority in parliament in order 
to do constitutional changes, making her extremely powerful. She censored the press and 
called it a “disciplined democracy” (Ibid: 03.02.1015). In 1977 INC suffered a major defeat 
against BJP. After internal strives, Indira Gandhi managed to unify the party, and won again 
in 1980. In 1984 Indira Gandhi was murdered by two of her bodyguards. Her son Rajiv took 
over the position until his death in 1991 (Ibid 31.05.2014 (a)).  
In the late 1980’s and 1990’s, INC tried to liberalise the economy. The period was 
characterised by corruption and, according to Thomas Blom Hansen, “the security 
apparatuses (...) unwillingness to retain law” (Hansen 1999: 152-153). P. V. Narashima Rao 
was INC’s leader until 1996, when he was investigated for corruption. Sitaram Kesri then 
took over. Sonia Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi’s widow, took over as leader in 1998. The turnout at 
the elections was bad both in 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2014. Surprisingly they won the election 
in 2004 led by Rahul Gandhi, Sonia Gandhi’s grandchild (SNL 31.05.2014 (a)).  
 
3.2.2 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
Shyama Prasad Mookerjee was, along with Jawaharlal Nehru, in the first government after 
independence. Mookerjee, however, disagreed in parts of the party’s goals after 
independence. When the Nehru Liquat Pact, on the 8th of April 1950, declined all 
responsibility and involvement above minorities in the newly formed Pakistan, Mookerjee 
immediately resigned (Bhandari 1990: 201). A few days later he wrote: 
At the time of India’s partition, without visualizing the fact that I will have to join the first Central 
Government as a Minister, I, along with many others, had assured the Hindu minorities in East Bengal 
that the case misfortunes visit them or they deprived of their basic rights as citizens, or their life and 
honour are tampered with or assaulted in the future set-up of Pakistan, independent India would not 
remain a silent or passive spectator. The Indian people and the Government will not feel shy of fighting 
for their just cause (Ibid: 201).   
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded in 1925, was basically a non-political 
organisation consisting primarily of youths who fought to promote the Hindu community. 
Between 1947 and 1951 however, the organisation became more politically engaged. 
Members involved themselves heavily in riots between Hindus and Muslims as a result of 
India’s division. When Mahatma Gandhi was killed on the 30th of January 1948 by a 
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fanatical Hindu, and member of RSS, many people within the RSS were arrested. Political 
activity within the organisation was for a period prohibited (Pillai 1990: 218).  
RSS wanted to support Mookerjee in forming a party that promoted “Bharatiya culture” 
(Indian culture) (Pillai 1990: 218-219). Cooperation between Mookerjee and RSS resulted in 
1951 with the party Bharatiya Jana Sangh, which would later become Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) (Ibid: 219). BJP was formed only a couple of months prior to the election in 1977. 
Thomas Blom Hansen says the party was created by individuals from different parties, “in 
spite of vague common programmatic statements”, emerging on a new platform which 
primarily wanted to defeat Indira Gandhi (Hansen 1999: 131).  
In the early 1980’s, BJP attempted to reach out to Muslims, displaying a secular tolerance 
seeking to gain voters and moving away from RSS’s ideology  (Hansen 1999: 157-158). In 
fact, Hansen writes that between 1980-1987, BJP’s program and strategies was: 
 A moderate Hindu nationalist ideology combined with a cautious moral critique of Congress 
 management of the state, and guided by an overriding ‘logic of opposition’ - that is, a sustained effort 
 to create a measure of unity among the disparate forces opposing Congress (Ibid: 158).  
In 1984 INC had its best election ever, much to do with the sympathy wave after the murder 
of Indira Gandhi, which will be mentioned later (Hansen 1999: 158). After the election, BJP 
scrutinised their own political strategies and ideology (Ibid: 159). In the end of the 1980’s 
they gathered votes by mobilising an aggressive rhetoric of Hindu culture. They highlighted 
the Muslim minority as “the enemy”  (NUPI. N.d. (a)). BJP’s profile became “the defender of 
Hindu society” (Hansen 1999: 159). They became a right-wing Hindu nationalist party 
claiming to stand for “one country, one culture, one nation and Dharma Raj (the rule of law)” 
(Pillai 1990: 220). The main reason for this strategy was to win back support from RSS. In 
1989 BJP gradually built up a communal rhetoric using slogans against INC’s relation with 
the Muslim population. Several of them was widely used the following years: “foreign 
infiltration”, “pseudo secularism”, and “pampering of minorities” (Hansen 1999: 160).  
During the 1980’s, India’s “economic growth and living standards” was badly ranked from an 
international standard. By appealing to the elite, and middle class, who might feel threatened 
by the caste quotas for low castes, BJP gained support (Tenhunen 2012: 77). BJP promised 
the upper castes to oppose quotas which allotted the lower castes. They promised 
entrepreneurs a more business-friendly economic policy and assured aid for those suffering 
from the economic reforms. Beyond belief, BJP even managed to gain support from the low 
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castes by arranging aid programs in poor neighbourhoods (Ibid: 78). BJP won the election in 
1996, but the government only lasted thirteen days (SNL 31.05.2014. (b)). Towards the end 
of the 1990’s, BJP became more known for wanting to better the economic growth. Their 
new profile paid off as they gained governmental power from 1998 to 2004 (NUPI. N.d. (b)).  
BJP struggled for a long time with their ideological profile and the lack of good leader 
profiles. This might be one of the reasons for why BJP, with Nerendra Modi, won the 
election in 2014: the party had finally gained a new strong profile and was now unified. The 
election in 2014 was mainly concerned with economics and development. After years of 
economic growth, India had experienced an economy characterised by inflation on food, 
increasing foreign debt and increasing unemployment. With Indian politicians known to be 
both corrupt and inefficient, Indians were probably tired of false promises. During the 
election of 2014, Modi promised growth to all, giving a vision of economic growth 
throughout India. It has been inconceivable that a single party would get the majority in the 
Indian parliament. However, BJP managed to get over half the seats in parliament. This has 
not happened since 1984 with INC, though this may have been a result of sympathy votes in 
response to the murder of Indira Gandhi (NUPI. N.d. (b)).   
 
3.3 National identity and caste  
Caste and the parties’ history have been mentioned above. Already, INC and BJP’s 
connection to caste may be glimpsed. It is yet to discover whether caste is seen a “vital 
ingredient” in their view of national identity.  
Anthony D. Smith believes religion is the very essence of national identities (Smith 2003: 
29). He is concerned with the “persistent strength and scope of national identities, and the 
passions they evoke” (Ibid: 3). The problem with nations and nationalism, Smith argues, is 
the “great and lasting worldwide appeal of nations and nationalism and the often deep 
attachment and passions generated by a sense of national identity” (Ibid: 4). It seems 
nationalists have chosen, and rather interpreted, some symbols, mythologies, religions, 
traditions and beliefs by legitimating them to previous “nationally ‘relevant’ belief-systems” 
(Ibid: 6). Smith explains three levels of analysis of national identity: the official, the popular, 
and the underlying level (Ibid: 28). These will be explained while the parties’ vision and 
actions are considered continuously.  
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3.3.1 The official level  
The official level look at national identity in the public through official doctrines and laws, as 
opposed to people’s everyday practice (Smith 2003: 28). It is the national goals, doctrines and 
the official versions taught in schools. Below is a description of the incident happening in 
Gujarat, India, in 2002. The event clearly illustrates the parties’, especially BJP’s, view of 
national identity through doctrines, laws, education and (the lack of) action.   
In 2002 a horrendous anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat took place where thousands of Muslims 
lost their lives. At a train station in Godhra, a train with Hindu pilgrims caught fire. Fifty-
eight people died (Nussbaum 2007: 2). Most likely it was a terrible accident added up by a 
number of different factors, but the Muslims were immediately blamed (Ibid: 35; Ibid 2; Ibid: 
19). Violence spread the following days to the rest of the state. In the wake of the incident, 
allegedly two thousand Muslims were murdered. Some within the police “egged it on“, not 
ordering to stop the violence. (Ibid: 2). Gujarat’s chief minister at the time, Nerendra Modi 
(India’s current president) encouraged the murders. The incident conveyed that the nations 
citizens should be treated unequally (Ibid: 2). According to Modi, the violence happening in 
Gujarat was a “natural and uncontrollable reaction” which “no police force could control” 
(Ibid: 28). The most disturbing, was the political and governmental bodies unwillingness to 
stop the violence (Ibid: 2). The incident in Gujarat show the increasing passivity among 
police and military in India (Robinson 2012: 19).  
There is something about the idea of violence that relates to ethnic cleansing and genocide 
(Nussbaum 2007: 22). It should be noted that Nussbaum’s definition of the events as 
“genocide“ is her choice of terminology. It is not something which is established, nor widely 
recognised. Nevertheless, the incident in Gujarat correlates with the United Nations 
Convention on Genocide, Article 2: 
 In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, 
 in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious  group, as such: (a) Killing members of the 
 group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting 
 on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) 
 Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the 
 group to another group (Ibid: 45). 
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Nussbaum writes that: 
  The evidence of long-term and deliberate construction of hatred undermines any claim that these 
 events were just the acts of a mob that got out of control. India is a democracy committed to the rule of 
 law. And yet the rule of law broke down in Gujarat (Nussbaum 2007: 45).  
“Gujarat indicates a sophisticated plan for total extermination,” Nussbaum says (Ibid: 21). 
According to evidence, the violence emerged after being deliberately constructed and planned 
over time (Ibid: 23; Ibid 20). The event show how religious ideology have threatened the rule 
of law. Nussbaum writes that Gujarat is an example of how bad things may occur “when a 
leading political party bases its appeal on a religious nationalism wedded on ideas of ethnic 
homogeneity and purity” (Ibid: 2). Further, it show how the law enforcement and government 
treat their citizens differently (Ibid: 1-2). Nussbaum writes that the “carnage was aided and 
abetted both by the police and by local politicians” (Ibid: 21).  
The Hindu right managed to convince Hindus that their common enemies were not the high 
caste Hindus, but rather the Muslims (Nussbaum 2007: 21). BJP is presenting an idea of a 
Muslim conspiracy that is working against democracy. The idea seems to be very efficient 
when it comes to collecting votes (Ibid: 30). RSS, mentioned earlier, is a social movement, 
and a predecessor to BJP, which sort to promote Hindu interests. RSS is influential in Indian 
politics as many of BJP’s members are also members of RSS. The organisation have at times 
been prohibited due to their anti-Muslim profile. (Jacobsen 2010: 247). The connection 
between BJP and RSS partly explains BJP’s anti-Muslim profile.  
In 2004 the “US Commission on International Religious Freedom found Modi to have been 
complicit in the Gujarat violence” (Nussbaum 2007: 50). The State Department’s 
International Religious Freedom Report found that the incident and the violence could be 
traced to the ideology of Hindutva (Ibid: 50). The Hindutva ideology emphasise on ethnic-
religious purity and the importance of belonging to a “Hindu nation” (Jaffrelot 2003: 476). 
Modi and his government promoted “attitudes of racial supremacy” where issues such as 
Nazism was glorified (Nussbaum 2007: 50). The US Department found that Hitler was 
described to have a “charismatic personality” in school textbooks (Ibid: 50). As a result, 
Modi was denied diplomatic visa by the US. His tourist visa was further revoked (Ibid: 51). 
The disagreement between the United States and Modi, however, seems to be long forgotten. 
In this year’s April issue of TIME magazine’s The world’s most influential people, Modi’s 
positivistic review was written by no other than the President of the United States, Barack 
Obama (Obama 27.04.2015/04.05.2015: 65).  
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In 2002, two historical textbooks were published as part of the National Council of 
Educational Research and Training (NCERT), an important part of India’s education system 
(Flåten 2012: 1-2). BJP’s educational reform, publishing new textbooks, was a political 
“identity project” (Ibid: 287). The textbooks, Medieval India and Contemporary India, 
promotes “uniform and timeless values underneath the surface of historical change” (Ibid: 
291). It is “an imagined community, defined according to Hindu cultural values” (Ibid: 291). 
This is worrisome as one of democracy’s most vital ingredients is education. What the 
children learn during their years of education will stick with them throughout their lives. 
They learn how to face problems and whether or not to ask questions and be critical 
(Nussbaum 2007: 264). The Hindu right want to present an orthodox and singular view on 
history and national identity (Ibid: 331). Such an approach has made Gujarat very different. 
Their textbooks are notorious for not encouraging critical thinking, which is crucial within 
academia. These are factors that supported the eruption of violence in Gujarat (Ibid: 25-26). 
Poor and frustrated Indians increasingly find comfort in religion-based political parties. 
Gujarat is located at the border to Pakistan. This is an important factor for Hindus because 
many connect Muslims with Pakistan. Muslims in Gujarat are more likely educated, and 
hence rather well off, compared to elsewhere in India. This factor may cause envy and 
resentment by Hindus which are poor or unemployed (Nussbaum 2007: 24). By imprinting 
the idea of an anti-democracy Muslim conspiracy, BJP has found an effective way for 
attracting votes and support from Hindus (Ibid: 30).  
INC has a strong and long-standing focus on Dalits. INC, and their voters’, support of 
Mahatma Gandhi was one of several factors behind INC’s success. By incorporating Article 
17 of the Constitution, which prohibits “untouchability,” and taking measures towards higher 
education among low-caste, they retained the voters for a long time (Jaffrelot 2003: 89-90). 
After the incident in Gujarat, INC repeatedly declared that India was built on values of 
respect and equality among all citizens and religious groups (Nussbaum 2007: 3).  
INC’s closest incident to that of Gujarat, was the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi in 1984. This was 
caused by the assassination of Indira Gandhi (then leader of INC) by her Sikh bodyguards 
(Nussbaum 2007: 22). For the Sikhs of India, Punjab is their homeland, while India is their 
nation. During the 1980’s the idea of an independent Sikh nation called Khalistan grew. The 
military organisation Akali Dal was founded in the 1920’s with the purpose to promote Sikh 
orthodoxy under British rule. Not all Sikhs supported Akali Dal. Sikh’s voting loyalty in 
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India had been split between INC and Akali Dal. In the 1970’s, however, Akali Dals support 
increased. The leader of INC, and then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi wanted to create 
disunity within Akali Dal. She therefore supported a young militant leader named 
Bhindranwale, in trying to attract voters to INC. Bhindranwale himself was unaware of Indira 
Gandhi’s intentions. When it turned out that Bhindranwale became popular among the 
population, Indira Gandhi choose to use military force against him and his followers. In 1984 
“Operation Blue Star”  was performed. The army stormed the gold temple Harmadir in 
Amritsar, where many Sikhs had sought refuge. Numerous Sikhs were there to celebrate the 
martyrdom day of Guru Arjan. This lead both supporters and non-supporters of Bhindranwale 
being killed. A few months later, Indira Gandhi herself was killed by her Sikh bodyguards. 
This was the start of a blood bath (Jacobsen 2006: 67). These riots however, were not an 
outgrowth of years of hatred. They were an act of revenge. Horrible as it was, INC’s 
intentions were not driven by a motive of ethnic-cleansing (Nussbaum 2007: 23). 
The motives by BJP towards Muslims in Gujarat and INC towards Sikhs in Amritsar, are 
clearly different. Make no mistake: both incidents were gruesome. The incidents does 
however point to interesting ideological themes. BJP ulterior motives consisted of anti-
Muslim intentions in Gujarat. By giving all Hindus a common enemy, they saw an 
opportunity to gain additional voters. Hence, BJP excluded a group in hope of gaining 
another. In the aftermath of “Operation Blue Star”, INC’s ideology seems to be the opposite. 
The party rather sorted to include Sikhs in order to gain more votes. The outcome was 
terrible. The incidents show INC’s and BJP’s different ideologies.  
Identities are not static. They continuously alter in response to factors within a nation and as a 
reaction to its surroundings. Caste identities have changed since low castes may get education 
and/or better jobs (Tenhunen 2012: 40). However, economic status and caste has been, and is, 
highly connected. Even today, caste-based discrimination is an important factor for the lack 
of economic development. People affected by economic and social disadvantages is by the 
Indian Constitution divided into three groups  (Sekhon 2000: 49). These groups are: 
1. The Scheduled Castes (SCs): Dalits (untouchables). 
2. The Scheduled Tribes (STs): aboriginals and people from most tribes. 
3. The Other Backward Classes (OBCs): economically underprivileged groups (Jeffery 
2010: 9).  
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The two first categories were implemented already by 1950. The third category was not 
established until August 1990. (Hasan 2010: 166). The classification of OBCs is somewhat 
unclear. It is therefore difficult to know who should be assign this status. This is due to the 
parallel of caste and economic status (Sekhon 2000: 49).  
Near half of the jobs in the Central Government in India have been reserved for Dalits by 
quota. (Tenhunen 2012: 41). A reservation system established for the STs and SCs have been 
accepted since independence (Sekhon 2000: 50; Hasan 2010: 165). During the 1950’s about 
22.5% of the seats within education and work was reserved to the lower castes (Tenhunen 
2012: 41). However, reservations to OBCs have been rather controversial. During the INC-
government in 1955, the Kalelkar Commission was the first to try. Its recommendations were 
not successful (Hasan 2010: 165). In 1978, during the Janata Dal Government, a second 
attempt was made (Tenhunen 2012: 42; Hasan 2010: 165). The Mandal Commission, 
established by BJP, found that caste was a contributing factor for economic differences. The 
commission suggested that several seats should be reserved for OBCs. Sadly, this was not 
implemented by the government who feared opposition from parts of the population (Sekhon 
2000: 50). In 1990 the Janata Dal government was led by V. P. Singh during a non-INC 
coalition (Tenhunen 2012: 41; Hasan 2010: 165). The government attempted a “partial 
implementation of recommendations leading to widespread unrest and opposition from 
middle- and upper-caste youths, intellectuals, and elites” (Sekhon 2000: 50). BJP was 
strengthened as a result of the new quotas being accepted (Tenhunen 2012: 41).  
It seems BJP are inclusive towards the low castes and Dalits as all castes are included in their 
definition of being “Indian”. It is rather the Indian minorities, such as Christians and Muslims 
which are excluded. By leaving the minorities outside, new discriminated groups are created. 
Minority religions are hence affected by the caste system while not being included.   
Dag Erik Berg believes Dalits has become an “integral part of India’s constitutional state” 
due to their designation as Scheduled Castes (Berg 2011: ix). These legal developments point 
to the Indian inconsistency relating caste. It is a paradox that India prohibits caste 
discrimination in the Constitution, while implementing political support for those 
discriminated on the background of caste. Caste is used politically to compensate for its 
presence in society (Vaid 2010: 186). India denies that caste discrimination is included in 
CERD, while taking special measures towards Dalits and low castes. Berg describes this as 
two opposing trends in the Dalit situation: “the upward social mobility contrasting with 
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enduring atrocities” (Berg 2011: x). The tension in India is based on hierarchy on the one 
hand and equality on the other. Berg explains that “the social dynamics are integrated in the 
legal framework, revealing the complexity of the problems” (Ibid: x).  
In India’s Constitution, Article 25, some minorities are defined under the Hindu “umbrella” 
(Robinson 2012: 11). It states: “the reference to Hindus shall be construed as a reference to 
persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion.” (Ministry of Law and Justice 
29.07.2008). This is problematic as it deprives human self-understanding of identity. If one 
converts to religions outside this definition, one is deprived ones rights. For instance, the 
Hindu Succession Act deprives children of converts inheritance if they are not Hindus at the 
line of succession (Robinson 2012: 12).  
INC has adopted a number of costly initiatives to improve the situation among lower castes. 
In 2006, the government, led by INC, launched a quota system which extended the idea that it                              
should be easier for people within low castes to pursue higher education (Hasan 2010: 165). 
This resulted in half of the academic seats being reserved for the lower castes in 2008. 
Despite the majority of Dalits living in poverty, the quotas have brought new opportunities to 
the Dalits and have succeeded in reducing social imbalances (Tenhunen 2012: 40). The 
problem was that some groups that should have been incorporated into the quotas, fell 
outside. When the authorities only included caste, non-Hindus was structurally discriminated 
against (Ibid: 186). The good intentions may have unintentional outcomes in that other 
religious minorities are either incorporated in or excluded by the system. Both of these 
outcomes are problematic (Vaid 2010: 186). Although the intentions may be good, the 
outcome had its down sides. This seems to have been an ongoing process in India.  
On their web page BJP have defined good governance to include the weak and vulnerable in 
society. BJP want to abolish the three quotas and replace them with merits. Merits focus on 
peoples engagement and will power, rather than caste and class. The historic injustices of 
castes are hence compensated by equality. On their web page, they have written that “the BJP 
is the only true merit-based democratic political party in India” (BJP N.d.).   
The quotas polarize society and thus strengthen caste distinctions, which should be the 
opposite of its intention (Tenhunen 2012: 40). According to Sirpa Tenhunen and Minna 
Säävälä, caste identities still linger partly due to the world’s largest experiment in “allocating 
quotas for the marginalized groups” (Ibid: 41). Further, the situation for the minority 
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religions in India is complex. Either, one is excluded from advantageous quota systems, or 
one is deprived one’s self understanding of identity. The quota system is hence problematic 
as it clings on to the term of caste in defining national identity and Indian’s rights.  
 
3.3.2 The popular level  
The popular level focuses on religious beliefs and national ideals, as well as what people 
underpins their ideas with (Smith 2003: 29). The parties’ underpinning ideas are visible 
throughout the chapter, also within the other levels. The popular level will thus not be studied 
as thorough as the other two levels. 
By looking at the official level, one might already see the parties’ national and religious 
beliefs. The parties’ views becomes even clearer when studying their views on nation 
building. There exists two models regarding nation building: 1. the integration model and 2. 
the interdependence model (Gautam 1990: 94-95). The integration model seeks to 
“nationalise” minorities (Ibid: 95). It springs out of the lassiez-faire philosophy that opposes 
government economic regulations among the poor in society (Ibid: 97). Consequently, the 
model rather reflects the national culture of the elite (Ibid: 100).  
BJP continuously has to “play a double rhetorical game” by speaking “moderately to appeal 
to the centre“, while sending ideological messages to its main base (Nussbaum 2007: 183). 
However, surveys from the 1990’s shows that BJP took the majority of the votes from the 
higher castes (Jaffrelot 2003: 481). BJP has a strong nationalistic view on the Indian state, 
and is strongly influenced by the Hindatva ideology that emphasise the importance of 
belonging to a “Hindu nation”. The party therefore seems to belong to the integration model 
(Ibid: 476). As mentioned above, Mookerjee further seemed to feel a kind of commitment to 
all Hindus, not just those within the nation’s borders. The strategy of the Westphalian 
formula in 1648 sought to coordinate political and religious identity (Beyer 2006: 69). 
Despite its origination in Western Europe, this may be traceable through BJP’s vision. Beyer 
writes that: 
 The capacity of the state to set collectively binding norms for the people within its territorial 
 boundaries and thus its abilities to make a particular religion an unavoidable part of these people’s 
 daily lives lends the religion a clear presence as a religion over and beyond what non-state religious 
 organizations can do in this regard  (Ibid: 111).   
42 
 
The interdependence model seek to include all minorities and ethnicities within the 
description of the national identity (Gautam 1990: 95). It further recognises ethnic groups’ 
need of recognition and financial support (Ibid: 97). The launching of the quota system by the 
INC-led government in 2006 underpins this (Hasan 2010: 165). As shown earlier, INC’s 
strategy under colonial rule was to avail themselves to this particular model. Because of 
India’s diversity, this procedure was probably what made the party so successful for so long 
(Gautam 1990: 100).  
Nussbaum sums up the parties’ visions in a simple, yet direct way:  
 One sees the unity of the nation as consisting in moral and political principles affirmed by people who 
 differ in religion, region, and ethnicity; the other sees unity as consisting in the soil of the motherland 
 and in the majority’s undivided allegiance to a single religious/ ethnic culture. One sees richness in 
 inclusiveness; the other finds inclusiveness messy, unmanly and humiliating (Nussbaum 2007: 332).   
 
3.3.3 The underlying level  
Smith calls the underlying level for “sacred foundations”. It considers items such as 
memories, values, symbols and myths the nation considers to be “holy”. The underlying 
dimensions are history, territory, community, and destiny (Smith 2003: 31). Smith writes 
about “a sacred communion of the people” where the nation has a psychological bond that 
binds them together as an “ancestral territory” (Ibid: 32). His point is that where a community 
of believers coincide with ethnicity, the community is reinforced by making it into “a holy 
congregation” (Ibid: 33).  
The end of the 1880’s is the beginning of what later came to be defined as “Hinduism” 
(Beyer 2006: 190). The mobilisation against British colonialism was associated with 
nationalism. Despite having had other unifying factors, such as the Vedas, nationalism was 
something new. It adapted itself to European notions (Jacobsen 2010: 246). The colonial 
background is hence important in explaining the construction of national identity. It is 
because of this background, and process, that India is turned into a modern nation. INC arose 
as a response to the British, representing a secular nationalism. BJP was created as a retort to 
INC, representing a “Hindu nation”. (Ibid: 247). 
“Hinduism” was not an established concept before the British colonial rule was created. 
(Jacobsen 2010: 37). Hinduism was neither a homogenous religion. It rather became a 
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collectively term for the different religious schools. (Jacobsen 2010: 13). At the time of the 
British invasion, the names of the different schools (darśana) and cults (such as the Shaivas 
and Vaishnavas) already existed. The caste system was integrated in the religious schools and 
cults, due to the castes’ different religious duties and obligations. (Jacobsen 2010). Further, 
castes’ functions were, and still are, so much more than religious.  
When the concept of nationalism was created, it was seen by many as a substitute for religion 
(Smith 2003: 10). In this respect, the nation-state takes over religious functions (Ibid: 9). 
Religion, however, seems to be both present in and the origin of nations (Ibid: 15). 14. 
August 1947 the state of Pakistan was created, separated out of India. The two independent 
states, India and Pakistan, were divided on the basis of the religious differences. Pakistan 
became a Muslim majority, and India a Hindu majority. The separation of the two nations 
had fatal consequences for many people, regardless religion. Fifteen million refugees crossed 
the border into regions that were alien to them, showing that their identities were tied to 
geography as well as religion. The provinces of Punjab and Bengal were also divided, which 
had catastrophic consequences for both Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs (Keen. July 2012).  
The genesis of nations created new boundaries between people in the physical sense. But this 
does not mean that earlier forms of borders such as culture, language and religion 
disappeared (Smith 2003: 6). This is the point of the BJP. Despite the fact that India is a 
multicultural state and a territorial collective, BJP see the nation as one culture (Ibid: 3). 
BJP’s view therefore fits Smith’s description of an “ancestral territory” as  the community of 
believers coincide with ethnicity (Ibid: 32). When posing as president, Mookerjee said the 
following in one of his speeches: 
Our party finally believes that the future of Bharat lies in the proper appreciation and application of 
Bharatiya Sanskriti and Maryada. While we, therefore, aim at establishing a Dharma Rajya or a Rule of 
law, we only abide by the highest tradition of Bharatiya Sanskriti that bind all people together in ties of 
real amity and fraternity (Pillai 1990: 222).  
BJP’s affiliation to Hinduism and Sanskrit texts becomes highly evident. Mookerjee is here 
referring to the varṇāśramadharma. The party ideology dictates that “Hindus are NOT a 
community - they are a Nation” (Ibid: 222). Such a thought is incompatible with Sikhs, 
Muslims, and other minorities’ view of the Indian nation.  
As mentioned during the presentation of BJP, Mookerjee resigned from his position in 
government when the Nehru Liquat Pact declined all responsibility and involvement above 
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the Hindu minority in Pakistan (Bhandari 1990: 201). Mookerjee had assured the Hindu 
minority living in East Bengal that the Indian government would protect them, saying that 
“independent India would not remain a silent or passive spectator. The Indian people and the 
Government will not feel shy of fighting for their just cause” (Ibid: 201).  This example, and 
the different positions of Nehru and Mookerjee, show the different views of BJP and INC. 
While BJP is describing a cultural nationalism, INC represent a territorial nationalism (Pillai 
1990: 229). 
BJP was founded in order to continue the work of the Jana Sangh party with a somewhat 
more moderate program. The BJP, concentrated merely on factors which were viewed as key 
symbols of Hinduism. One of the most significant examples was their wish to construct a 
Hindu temple on the location of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, built in 1528. By many 
Hindus, this is seen as the birth place of Rama, an incarnation of the god Vishnu. The 
campaign spread nationwide. In 1992 the mosque was demolished by Hindu fundamentalists. 
Thousands of people died in the violence erupting in the aftermath (Tenhunen 2012: 76).  
The most influential form of nationalism in India has however been that of INC, who 
represents an India which includes all religious and ethnic groups. The 30th of January 1948, 
Mahatma Gandhi was murdered by a fundamentalist Hindu. This caused a rise in the 
nationalistic view of INC. According to Sirpa  Tenhunen and Minna Säävälä, the rise of the 
BJP therefore seems primarily to be linked to the economic reforms and the changes in Indian 
politics and society (Tenhunen 2012: 77). 
Authenticity is important for nationalistic beliefs (Smith 2003: 37). It is irreplaceable and 
fundamental to mankind. It represents what separates “us” from “them”, making them unique 
and irreplaceable (Ibid: 40). India consists of a wide diversity of people with twenty-two 
official languages and different religious groups such as Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, 
Buddhists, Jains and Jews. Regional differences are also enormous. For centuries 
communication across borders has been as common as interaction within the country 
(Nussbaum 2007: 7). To say what is “typical” Indian is therefore challenging.  
According to Benedict Anderson, the community of a nation is imagined through a common 
history, while at the same time it is wanted and felt (Smith 2003: 21-23). Desire and devotion 
are therefore necessary for a nation to persist (Ibid: 23). Both INC and BJP believe in a 
common Indian history, but their viewpoints are different. A question worth asking is 
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whether BJP’s understanding of identity is “easier” to categorise and maintain. If a nation 
becomes too rich on different cultures, internal conflicts may occur more easily. There may 
also occur a form of assimilation, where the nation’s cosmopolitan culture is sacrificing the 
residents’ national identity (Ibid: 259). This is the “disadvantage” with INC’s view of 
nationality. However, Smith writes that a nation with a rich and varied heritage have a greater 
chance of maintaining their national communities despite cosmopolitan assimilation pressure. 
A nation that does not have a rich heritage underpinning their national identity, will be less 
able to resist external pressure (Ibid: 260).  
Beyer describes Hinduism as a modern invented and imagined structure consisting of 
selective combinations (Beyer 2006: 188). This may be seen in context to Smith’s sacred 
foundation, as the underlying level, describes what is considered to be “holy” (Ibid: 189). As 
mentioned, Smith believes religion is the very essence of national identities (Smith 2003: 29). 
Beyer describes religion as an independent function system, interacting with other functional 
systems (Beyer 2006: 62). Function systems are important as they say something about the 
relationship within, and relationship to others (Ibid: 127). This may be found in the binary 
codes (Ibid: 43). Binary codes within function systems involves contradictions. For religion, 
the binary code is “blessed/ cursed” (Ibid: 85). The content within binary codes, as a religion 
defines itself within, will continuously be reinterpreted and be transferred into new contexts. 
This is how binary codes set guidelines for communication and function system (Ibid: 24). 
The thoughts of Hinduism are centred around mokṣa, which is the liberation from the 
continuous existence (samsāra) in which humans are a part of. That being said, Beyer does 
not expect people to achieve mokṣa in this life. The communicative structure is therefore 
rather centred around secondary codes as favorable/ unfavorable and clean/ unclean, rather 
than mokṣa/samsāra (Ibid: 84). Thus the caste system, which is connected with moksa-
samsara as well as the other binary codes, is the key element in the Hindu religious function 
system. 
As mentioned, the 1800’s is the beginning of what later came to be defined as “Hinduism” 
(Beyer 2006: 190). One can wonder why the caste system was not abolished as the Indian 
population came in contact with other groups of people. When leaders justified their positions 
on the background of caste and karma, it was probably attractive to keep the system alive. 
Each caste had its position and rank defined from an ancient tradition (Velassery 2005: 3-4). 
Dependent on the Brᾱhmaṇas’, i.e. the highest priestly caste, who were those who were 
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allowed to read the sacred books (the Vedas), India’s history was reconstructed by the British, 
favouring some models over others (Beyer 2006: 192). European society’s understanding  of 
religion is only a part of the development of the global function system of religion. The role 
of non-Western regions are just as important (Ibid: 74). The capitalist economy, centralised 
state, legislation, education and mass media attracted the Indian elite. Organisations and 
movements expressing the Brᾱhmaṇas’ viewpoint was propagated for (Ibid: 192). The British 
and the Indian elite therefore collaborated in defining what today is described as the singular 
unity of “Hinduism”  (Ibid: 75). 
Beyer points out that religious communication depends on the thematisation which is a result 
of its contrasts of communication (Beyer 2006: 10). The European idea of religion as a 
distinct and systematic domain was crucial (Ibid: 74). India used the term dharma as a 
response to the European “religion” by changing its meaning. It gave the double impression 
of Hinduism being both an old and modern invention (Ibid: 11). Sirpa Tenhunen and Minna 
Säävälä write:  
 The reaction of Hindu reformers to British colonialism and Christian missionaries was to reinvent the 
 past golden age of Hinduism thereby providing the Hindu elite with a way of embracing Western ideals 
 and at the same time retaining the essence of Hinduism (Tenhunen 2012: 76). 
Religion is given its form through the impact of other function systems such as law, state and 
media (Beyer 2006: 15). Media was long used by the British empire, partly to promote 
Christian mission. India’s school system further changed by the propaganda driven by Indian 
schools for the different versions of Hinduism in rebuttal to other worldviews. As a result of 
Britain’s growing power over Indians lives, Indians’ initiative against the British also 
increased. This lead to the increasing concern about what it meant to be “Hindu”. Indians 
went in debates against the Western missionaries and used different print mediums to spread 
their message (Ibid: 194). Indians did not have a unified message, but as a result of the 
Christianity presented itself as one religion, Hindus adopted a similar position (Ibid: 84). 
Foreign influences seemed to be regarded as a threat, which lead to a reformulating of Hindu 
ideals in order for them to match Western values (Tenhunen 2012: 76). This example 
illustrates the process of religious identification’s creation in response to others (Beyer 2006: 
194-195). This meant that those who were not “something else” was described as Hindus in 
the absence of other descriptions (Ibid: 198). Hinduism thus became an umbrella term 
without being defined (Ibid: 199).  
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The term of Hinduism was not developed on the background of a long history nor a 
continuous institution (Beyer 2006: 84). Neither did it originate out of nothing. Rather, it 
reinterpreted “religio-cultural” aspects within society, adding the concept of religion (Ibid: 
75). Hinduism has came to be treated as one of the uniform world religions centralised 
around the Vedas (Ibid: 84).  
INC and BJP’s memories and interpretations of the past and present is continuously 
developed. The Hindu construction is further far from homogeneous. Not everyone who is 
considered to be Hindus are practicing Hinduism. Hinduism also seems to have had more 
than a religious significance. The distinction between the religion of Hinduism and Hindu as 
a cultural and national identity, therefore seems to be ambiguous (Beyer 2006: 189).  
Hindu nationalism does not represent traditional Hinduism. It rather represent a new 
interpretation of Hindu tradition based on Western influences (Tenhunen 2012: 76). Despite 
being only a couple of hundred years old, the term “Hinduism” is today, for the most part, 
accepted by the majority of Hindus. Despite being a relatively young term, Hinduism has a 
historical reference going back thousands of years. (Jacobsen 2010: 13). Robertson says that 
“traditionally close ties between religions and particular cultures encourages the formulation 
of national and personal identities vis-á-vis the global systems in terms of particular 
religions” (Beyer 1994: 29). As mentioned, Smith believes a community of believers 
coinciding with ethnicity reinforces itself by making it into “a holy congregation” (Smith 
2003: 33). This may explain the rise of fundamentalists in India (Beyer 1994: 29).  
BJP’s understanding of Hinduism as a distinctive religion is not to be found within history. It 
is rather expressed from the group’s adherents (Beyer 2006: 84). The construction of religion 
has been used by nationalists in order to rise and gain power (Ibid: 189). Nationalist party’s 
attempts trying to deny the difference between religious and national identity leads to a re-
differentiation of the Hindutva ideology, saying it contains of several religions, as well as a 
lack of explanation of what “Hindu” entails (Ibid: 7). Nationalism is important for the Hindu 
right. Religion is therefore “reconstructed for nationalistic purposes” (Nussbaum 2007: 8). A 
religion does not only have to operate as a religion, but also to be observed as one. A 
collective representation is needed for people living together in groups. They need a common 
consciousness. (Ibid: 9). In this case, religion may be used as an adjustable resource within 
group identification (Beyer 2006: 7).  
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Hindutva ideology emphasise on ethnic-religious purity and the importance of belonging to a 
“Hindu nation” (Jaffrelot 2003: 476). Rather ambiguously, Hindutva emphasises on purity 
while also depending on low castes within “the hierarchy of purity” as the upper castes have 
its position at the expense of low castes. Hence, BJP wants to include the Dalits in the 
“Hindu Raj” (Hindu rule), where it is rather the Muslims and Christians which are excluded. 
BJP, and Hindu right, exploit theories of “authenticity” and “purity” by alienating non-
Hindus (Nussbaum 2007: 8). The Hindu right is hence convincing low caste Hindus “to put 
religion ahead of caste”. (Ibid: 21).  
Another process that should be mentioned in this context, is the political/administrative and 
legal process which sought to specify what Hinduism and Hindus were (Beyer 2006: 195). To 
avoid unnecessary resistance, the British wanted to keep Indian legislation as long as it 
functioned effectively. They did not want to influence the religious law, but to define its 
responsibilities within the family and heritage. There was therefore a need of defining 
religious legislation (Ibid: 196). Hinduism’s great diversity, its lack of a founder and 
organisation made it difficult to create a definition. As mentioned, the high caste Hindus, the 
Brāhmaṇa class, which was responsible for the dissemination of sacred books, was 
responsible for creating a definition (Jacobsen 2010: 23). The constructed definition remains 
to this very day (Beyer 2006: 196). Religious affairs were subject to political ones (Ibid: 
197). Democracy exists only in cases where there are different opinions among the people, 
and where these may be expressed. The British, however, seems to have defeated opposition 
by merging with the elite, and thus underpinning the caste system. “Local oppressors” on 
their side, got knowledge and access to weapons by allying with colonialism. While local 
rulers, to some extent, had been able to control their subjects, they were now also able to 
suppress them (Fernando 2002: 154). The religious function system was incorporated into the 
political. It was in this process the Hinduism institution came about (Beyer 2006: 197).  
Along British and the other previous imperial regimes, came capitalist economy, “academic 
education, mass media and differentiated religion” (Beyer 2006: 191). These included the 
elite increasingly more. The religious movements, organisations and systems was both a 
continuity and discontinuity of the previous, creating a re-imagining of cultural traditions and 
contributing to the construction of global systems (Ibid: 191). Hinduism is still, largely, a 
creature of the elite. Yet, millions of people around the world defines themselves in terms of 
this singular term. Hinduism in the 20th century still circulates between being a religion, and 
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being simply a cultural characteristic (Ibid: 200). This illustrates the ambiguous relation 
between the two (Ibid: 75). The boundaries of religions’ function system seems blurry, as 
Hinduism can be said to have been created as a result of a concurrence of developments 
within various functional systems (Ibid: 222).  
To sum up, “Hinduism” was established as a result of the British colonial rule. (Jacobsen 
2010: 37). Hinduism was constructed through numerous functional system, religion being 
only one of them. (Beyer 2006: 200). Nevertheless, Hinduism became a collectively term for 
the different religious schools. (Jacobsen 2010: 13). The caste system was thus integrated in 
the religious schools and cults, due to the castes’ different religious duties and obligations. 
(Jacobsen 2010). The colonial background explains the construction of national identity. It is 
on the background of this process that India became a modern nation. (Ibid: 247). The 
mobilisation against British colonialism was further associated with nationalism (Ibid: 246). 
The various views of British colonialism created different interpretations of national identity. 
My hypothesis is therefore confirmed. It is the parties’ connection to caste that protects the 
topic at the national arena. As caste, within Hinduism, was part of the national identity 
process, it is imprinted in both INC and BJP. INC arose as a response to the British, 
representing a secular nationalism. As Hinduism was created within numerous function 
systems, it became easy for Hindu nationalist parties and movement to emphasise on caste 
and religion in their politics. BJP was hence created as a retort to INC, representing a Hindu 
nation. (Ibid: 247). 
 
3.4 The vote of the people  
The parties connection to caste is now more clear. But what is Indians connection to caste? 
How has the voting been allocated between the two parties from 1947 to 2014? Have the 
majority voted for the BJP’s nationalist policies, or have they promoted the umbrella party 
INC? How is the social strata divided between the parties? Indians electoral votes has already 
been mentioned during the historical presentation of the political parties. The votes of India 
has nevertheless not been connected to the topic of caste.  
From independence in 1947 until 1967, INC dominated politically. (Heath 2010: 193). That 
being said, BJP’s predecessor was not founded until 1951. The reason behind INC’s massive 
support probably stems from their unifying entity in the liberation struggle against the British 
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colonial power. (Ibid: 189). In 1962, INC gained support evenly across social layers, gaining 
80% of the upper castes and 81% of the Muslim vote (Ibid: 194).  In 1964 Nehru died. His 
daughter Indira Gandhi was his successor. Internal strives and warfare with Pakistan led to a 
new era in India’s policy. The electoral competition changed, and the political landscape 
altered. The upper castes was suddenly less likely to vote INC (showing 48%), while the 
lower castes was somewhat more likely to vote INC (with 57%)  (Ibid: 195-196).  
From 1967 to 1993, as well as until recently, politics was dominated by the congressional 
opposition. Despite INC strong position, they no longer dominated (Heath 2010: 194). In 
1971, Indira Gandhi’s campaign was lead by the slogan “garibi hatao” (abolish poverty). INC 
swept the polls. (Ibid: 196). INC gained 65% of the votes from the upper castes, 68 % of the 
lower castes, and 75 % of the Muslim votes. (Ibid: 197). It is hard to spot any patterns in the 
votes in 1971. However, Janata Sangh is significantly underrepresented by Muslim votes with 
0%. In 1977 INC experienced a serious backlash. Their previous most loyal voting groups, 
the lower castes and the Muslims, was suddenly less likely to vote INC. Votes from low 
castes was now down to 41% and Muslims down to 52%. Upper castes was suddenly more 
likely to vote BJP. Oliver Heath and Yogendra Yadav does however not believe that social 
groups played any significant part in this election (Ibid: 199). In 1980, INC stormed back to 
power. Their support from upper castes was relatively low with 53%, compared to the 
support drawn from Muslims and lower castes (Ibid: 199-200). The period of INC-opposition 
changed from drawing support almost equally across social categories, to in the 1960’s-
1970’s being less likely to gain votes from upper castes (Ibid: 200). A social division between 
castes were now more visible, and INC became increasingly dependent on the lower castes 
and minorities (Ibid: 189).  
The election in 1991 showed that BJP gained its support from Hindus in general, and upper 
castes in particular. INC however, seemed once again to be more of  a catch-all party, gaining 
support evenly drawn from the social groups (Heath 2010: 201-202). The trend further 
continued in 1998 and 2004. BJP gained strong support from upper castes, and INC received 
most support from lower castes (Ibid: 203). 
From 1996, the policy was characterised by an increasing awareness of low castes (Vohra 
2013: 310). The same year BJP got most of the votes. Their support increased further two 
years later (Ibid: 311). In 1999 they formed a coalition of caste-based parties called the 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (Nussbaum 2007: 178). The party’s power increased 
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further during these years by attempting to establish itself as something more than a “single-
issue party” (Ibid: 179).  
India’s nuclear weapon program was extremely popular and was seen as national pride as 
well as a step towards national security. In 2002, Abdul Kalam, the architect for the project, 
became president. Most likely this alleviated the relationship to Pakistan (Nussbaum 2007: 
179). At the election in 2004, BJP fought under the slogan “India Shining”. Despite the 
somewhat less religious appearance, their kinship to religion still was significant for voters. 
INC had a political strategy that tried to separate religion and state while promoting respect 
towards minorities (Ibid: 180).  
BJP has managed to give India economic growth and lifted the country up to the political 
“prestige arena” among other great nations (Vohra 2013 347). Few believed INC would do 
better than the BJP in the 2004 elections, but the predictions before the election had ignored 
the “man in the street”, belonging to the lower layer of society. BJP has a strong connection 
to Hinduism in general and high castes in particular. Their focus on the high-ranked castes 
and disregard of low-caste families, led them to unexpectedly losing the election in 2004, 
giving INC the power. Despite India’s economic recovery, the situation remained unchanged 
for the lower classes (Ibid: 358). BJP’s association with L. K. Advani, vice president and 
associated with the event in Babri Mosque mentioned previously, did not help. INC’s leader, 
Italian Sonia Gandhi, also realised that the party could easily come to power by collaborating 
with smaller regional parties. In 2009 these factors led to INC having its best election in 
twenty-five years. INC had once again become the national party they had strived to be. 
When BJP after elections stated that a “foreigner” as Sonia Gandhi could not become prime 
minister, she avoided the conflict by selecting Sikh Manmohan Singh as president (Ibid: 
359). By Sikhs, this was seen as a reconciliation between Sikhs and Hindus after “Operation 
Blue Star” in 1984 (Jacobsen 2006: 67).  
In 2014, BJP won the election by a large margin. The outcome was a result of two factors: 
their strong political leader Modi, and the wretched campaigning of INC. INC’s prime 
minister candidate Rahul Gandhi, Indira Gandhi’s grandchild, simply seemed unmotivated. 
Further, INC’s involvement in numerous corruption scandals did not help  (NUPI N.d. (b)).  
The party support show some continuity from 1962. First is INC’s weakness among upper 
castes and strength among Muslims. The Janata Dal and its successors have a tendency to 
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gain most support from upper castes. The discontinuities is mainly caused by the rise of BJP 
who appeal to a particular social group rather than all of society. This has lead to a 
strengthening of what Oliver Heath and Yogendra Yadav call “the caste-community 
cleavage” (Heath 2010: 206). The social differences have increased (Ibid: 189). Coalitions 
consisting of BJP and INC have been pressured by the opposition “to proceed at a snail’s 
pace” (Manor 2010: 269). This suggests that the coalitions in many ways, at least indirectly, 
defend the low castes. Coalitions have further dampened the Prime Minister’s power abuse, 
which is a great contrast to how at the conditions were before 1989. Between 1998-2004, 
BJP’s nationalist agenda was shelved due to twenty-two, of the twenty-three, coalition parties 
unwillingness. Coalition governments has actually lowered the number of power abuses. Due 
to the coalition’s lack of interest, BJP have from 1998-2009 been forced to remove their 
policy related to the strong Hindu-nationalist agenda (Ibid: 269). The paradox for BJP is that 
in order to gain votes, they need to send a strong ideological statement to their voters, while 
having a moderate message appealing to the mass (Nussbaum 2007: 183).  
The complexity within the Indian society gives people a great span within what could be 
interpreted as identity. Identity can be interpreted on the basis of ethnicity, language, dialect, 
urban/rural, religion, caste, class and gender. Those who are somewhat more neutral and 
inclusive in the description of identity avoids, to a certain degree, tension and conflicts. They 
can also more easily respond to changes in what is considered as national identity. This 
stands in complete contrast to Hindu nationalists who emphasise the importance of religious 
identity (Manor 2010: 270).  
 
3. 5 Summary  
Initially, INC was an umbrella party soughing to unite Indians across caste, ethnicity and 
religion against British rule, fighting for secularism, democracy and social justice (Chand 
1990: 44). INC have had a long-standing focus on Dalits. Incorporating the prohibiting of 
“untouchability” in the Constitution, and taking measures towards higher education among 
low-caste, gave them support from the Dalits for a long time (Jaffrelot 2003: 89-90). One of 
their leaders, Indira Gandhi, have however been controversial. In 1975 she was charged for 
“having violated election law”, and declared state of emergency where she used her power to 
do constitutional changes, calling it a “disciplined democracy” (SNL 03.02.1015). Further, 
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the storming of the gold temple in Amritsar and the anti-Sikh riots show that INC does not 
have an unblemished record (Jacobsen 2006: 67). But unlike the incident in Gujarat, INC’s 
intentions were not driven by a motive of ethnic-cleansing (Nussbaum 2007: 23).  
BJP was founded as a result of Mookerjee disagreeing with India’s declined responsibility 
and involvement above minorities in the newly formed Pakistan (Bhandari 1990: 201). BJP 
became a right-wing Hindu nationalist party (Pillai 1990: 220). Towards the end of the 
1990’s, BJP became more known for wanting to better economic growth. Their new profile 
paid off. BJP struggled for a long time with their ideological profile and the lack of good 
leader profiles. Along Modi, the party had finally gained a strong profile in which unified the 
party (NUPI. N.d. (b)). Modi’s connection to the anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat in 2002 is 
nevertheless worrisome. As former chief minister in Gujarat, Modi encouraged the murders 
of Muslims. The event show how religious ideology have threatened the rule of law 
(Nussbaum 2007: 1-2). The demolishing of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, in 1992, and the 
prior campaign lead by BJP further show that their view of national identity is consistent 
(Tenhunen 2012: 76). BJP’s educational reform, publishing new historical textbooks, also 
show their political “identity project” (Flåten 2012: 287).  
Both BJP and INC have been involved in launching a quota system making it easier for 
people within low castes to pursue higher education (Hasan 2010: 165; Tenhunen 2012: 42). 
Despite the majority of Dalits living in poverty, the quotas have succeeded in reducing social 
imbalances (Tenhunen 2012: 40). However, according to Sirpa Tenhunen and Minna Säävälä, 
such quotas makes caste identities linger (Ibid: 41).  
While BJP regard Hindus as Indians, INC regard the diversity of inhabitants within the 
nation’s borders as Indians (Bhandari 1990: 21). BJP’s Hindutva ideology therefore seems to 
belong to the integration model (Jaffrelot 2003: 476). INC is rather connected to the 
interdependence model who seek to include all minorities and ethnicities within Indian 
national identity (Gautam 1990: 95). This becomes clear in their pretty stable voting trend, 
where BJP has gained strong support from upper castes, and INC has received most support 
from lower castes and Muslims showing their view of national identity. (Heath 2010: 203). 
Despite their different outlooks, by caste being incorporated into Hinduism, caste has also 
become a part of both parties’ Indian national identity.  
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4.0 The international level  
The international level is based on previous unpublished material. (Gravaas 2014: 
unpublished materials).   
International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) has attempted to join the Economic and Social 
Council’s (ECOSOC’s) fellowship for many years. The question of interest is: why has IDSN 
not obtained ECOSOC status?  
To start, the chapter will look into the challenge terminology brings by examining the term 
“caste”. The meaning of the ECOSOC status and how important it is for NGOs is further 
described. IDSN’s difficulties being accredited consultative status is considered, before 
presenting different explanations as to what is causing this situation. The chapter is finalised 
with thoughts regarding the future.  
 
4.1 Terminology  
A number of subjects can be discussed regarding the IDSN-UN relationship, such as the 
terminology of caste. The term “caste” does not exist in the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights (UDHR), nor any other international treaty within the field of human rights. The UN 
state that discrimination based on caste is included in the “machinery” of international human 
rights. However, their own terminology is: “discrimination based on work and descent” 
(IDSN August 2014: 7; IDSN N.d. b). This term reaffirms that caste discrimination is 
prohibited within UN human rights (IDSN N.d. b). The term represent characteristics 
affecting a particular population in societies located in different parts of the world. In South 
Asia, “caste discrimination” is used when describing such discrimination. Discrimination 
based on caste also exist in African countries. These communities are fare from homogenous. 
Their origins are nevertheless rooted in systems where people are hierarchically ranked on 
the background of purity and descent (IDSN Secretariat. August 2014: 6). 
It the UN there seem to be a tradition, or a tendency, of merging many terms into one 
collective term. The intention is good. They are attempting to include various groups, despite 
different localities. However, with such a broad definition, one might create confusion, 
risking to including no one. Further, it may easily be misused by some political actors with 
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ulterior motives. Politicians may utilise, and take advantage of, the term as an instrument to 
obtain their own political goals (IDSN N.d. b). 
Female discrimination gained much attention immediately after they were regarded as human 
rights. According to Keck and Sikkink, women’s transnational networks grew rapidly 
thereafter. The situation progressed quickly. The networks more easily gained support when 
regarded as a vulnerability issue (Keck 1998: 195). Being regarded as human rights, women's 
rights were automatically protected. This is what Charles Tilly calles the “adjacency 
principle”. Activists was suddenly capable to raise questions regardless ethnic and cultural 
differences across states (Ibid: 196). Transnational women’s network is brought up in order to 
show how a network may increase the process by being associated to human rights. 
Evidently the “adjacency principle” cannot be directly transmitted to caste (Keck 1998: 195-
196). Rikke Nöhrlind, Executive Director of IDSN, raise important questions in their Annual 
Report of 2013:  
 Why is caste discrimination still absent from the agenda of the UN human rights council? Is it a lesser 
 human rights cause than the struggle against apartheid and racism? Is it less important than 
 discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, sexuality, religion or gender? (IDSN N.d. a: 5).  
According to the UN, caste would fall under “discrimination based on work and descent”. 
The term caste is omitted from this designation (IDSN N.d. b). As mentioned earlier, the 
Indian government claimed in the CERD report, of 2007, that caste was not included in the 
Convention. (Jones 07.02.2014). The language is not specific enough. I fear the UN 
terminology has been somewhat diluted. The UN term makes it easier for states, such as 
India, to exploit and misuse the terminology (IDSN N.d. b). 
 
4.2 The work of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
The UN works continuously to strengthen its cooperation to NGOs, and strives to increase 
the possibilities for NGOs to gain participation rights in the UN. In 2000, this was even 
emphasised in the Millennium Declaration. In 2005, the member states committed to 
strengthen NGO’s participation through the World Summit Outcome Document. Today, the 
only body with a framework granting NGO’s participation rights in the UN, is the ECOSOC 
(UN 2011: 2).  
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ECOSOC coordinates work related to international social and economic issues, related to the 
UN’s special agencies, as well as regional and functional commissions. Further, they provide 
recommendations regarding this issue to member states. The member states within ECOSOC 
is elected on a three-year term. The representation is based on geography and consists of 
fifty-four members states. ECOSOC’s council cooperate with NGOs through panel 
discussions, meetings and sessions. The ECOSOC council meets once a year. This is the 
focal point the UN. International dialogue and cooperation, as well as policy review, are 
among the focus of the session (UN 2011: 4). 
Both the UN and NGOs mutually benefit from each other’s privileges through ECOSOC 
accreditation. NGOs may provide ECOSOC with valuable and competent expert advice and 
analysis. On the other hand, NGOs are legitimated in the UN, by being given participation 
rights (Willetts 2011: 38-39). Further, they are able to influence on certain issues of interest 
and raise public awareness on these topics. (UN 2011: 7). NGOs with consultative status are 
legitimated within the political process. This access is invaluable (Willetts 1996: 43). They 
are given annual passes which grants them access to UN meetings and premises (UN 2011: 8; 
Willetts 2011: 61). They are further able to attend events, having the opportunity to create 
new relations as well as lobbying. ECOSOC provides NGOs with a global audience (UN 
2011: 7).  
 
4.3 International Dalit Solidarity Network’s (IDSN’s) application 
to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
As mentioned, the only body with a framework granting NGO’s participation rights in the 
UN, is the ECOSOC. (UN 2011: 2). The status legitimates NGOs within the UN, and thereby 
the political system (Willetts 1996: 43).  
According to Peter Willetts; “NGOs have moved beyond the Charter limitations of 
consultative status with ECOSOC to a role in the Human Rights Council under the authority 
of the General Assembly.” NGOs are increasingly gaining new possibilities to participate 
actively within other committees (Willetts 2011: 72). Willetts may be right in his 
assumptions, but a consultative status should not be undermined. Accompanying the status 
grants both rights and obligations. The NGO’s members become legal actors (Ibid: 83).  
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IDSN has applied for consultative status in the ECOSOC since 2007. January 2008, their 
application was sent to the Regular Session of the Committee on NGOs. (IDSN October 
2014). Their application has not yet been approved. Currently, no organisation has waited this 
long in order to get their application finalised (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014). IDSN is in need of this 
status. It would give them direct accreditation, and free access to the UN which would make 
them into efficient contributors (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014; IDSN October 2014). They are 
prevented from participation in the Human Rights Council. They can neither present work in 
their own name  (IDSN October 2014). Their work is therefore currently “sponsored by”/ 
“co-sponsored by”  in accordance with NGO-members (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014). Without a 
finalised application, IDSN is deprived these rights (IDSN Secretariat August 2014: 4). 
ECOSOC status may be established for all non-profit NGOs (UN 2011: 26). In order to attain 
this status, six steps must be conducted:  
1. Make a profile. 
2. Submit application along with documentation.  
3. Screening of the application by the ECOSOC committee.  
4. Review from the committee.  
5. Committee recommendations.  
6. Final decision by the committee (Ibid: 27). 
The ECOSOC resolution 1996/31 state that every organisation striving towards the same 
principles as the UN and promote its knowledge, should be granted consultative status. IDSN 
are fulfilling these requirements (Al Marsad et al. 01.07.14: 1). So why is IDSN’s application 
still not finalised? There are several options to take into consideration. 
According to Kerstin Martens, NGOs access within the UN, depends on its characteristics 
such as ethics, values, work, culture and members. Martens refer to studies showing that it is 
the internal factors within a NGO, and how it organises itself, which determine its activity 
level within the UN. In principle, it is only formalities which grants NGOs access. Martens’ 
study show that NGOs are more dependent on internal factors, than what the UN formalities 
implies. Her view is that the UN is receptive for influence, but the initiative and ability must 
stem from the NGOs themselves (Martens 2005: 8).  
Martens argument is not valid in the case of IDSN. The organisation has, in principle, done 
everything right. Martens’ argument stated that NGO’s characteristics determine whether or 
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not they may enter the UN (Martens 2005: 8). In the case of IDSN, their values related to 
caste is hindering them access. IDSN is working with caste as a form of discrimination. 
Topics related to discrimination has greater transnational impact than other norms, according 
to Finnmore and Sikkink (Finnmore 1998: 907). Keck and Sikkink’s “adjacency principle”, 
explaining how transnational women’s networks quickly expanded once it was seen as human 
rights, cannot be transferred to caste (Ibid: 195-196). IDSN’s focus is a human rights issue. 
Regardless, their application is yet not finalised. Maina Kiai, special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Assembly and Association, have recorded forty-six human rights organisations with 
postponed accreditations (IDSN 21.10.2014). This shows the fragility of human rights issues.  
An important factor determining NGOs rights, is their level of trust between representatives 
in other NGOs and delegates in the governments (Willetts 2011: 62). A good reputation, 
reliability and integrity is very important. When this is established, information may be used 
solely on the background of trust (Willetts 1996: 45). 
IDSN has a number of partner organisations who is working on similar issues. An example is 
All India Dalit Mahila Adhikar Manch (AIDMAM), who in 2014 presented suggestions to 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in fighting 
caste discrimination in India. Some of these suggestion where included in CEDAW’s 
questionnaire, when examining India the same year (IDSN N.d. a: 10). A South Asian 
consultation based on caste as discrimination, was held by the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Nepal (Kathmandu), in 2013. The intention 
was to find a collective way to solve this issue for the different UN institutions and NGOs. 
Slowly, caste became more recognised. The same year, a breakthrough happened. An attempt 
was made in order to include this issue in the development agenda after 2015. Finally, the UN 
consultation regarded caste discrimination as inequality (Ibid: 11).  
A compilation has been created by the IDSN in order to document and monitor how caste is 
addressed by UN bodies. It also follows up on caste related recommendations from the UN 
(IDSN August 2014: 6). IDSN also contribute with their own suggestions to the UN, different 
governments and companies. IDSN’s compilation show their skills and collective willingness 
within the last twelve years. Before the creation of IDSN, caste was only referred to in one 
UN document from 1996. “There was no studies, no working tables, no documentations, 
nothing. It was a completely ignored issue,” Nöhrlind says (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014).  
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IDSN is in no way incompetent, nor unwilling, to face necessary challenges (IDSN August 
2014: 6). As mentioned, IDSN’s work is “sponsored by”/“co-sponsored by” in accordance to 
NGO-members, showing that other NGOs appreciate IDSN’s work. Special reporters are 
even asking for inputs from IDSN. This illustrates their level of reliability to other actors. 
IDSN has great insight on issues regarding caste discrimination within different countries. 
This has given them invaluable information which is desired from others (Nöhrlind 
17.11.2014).  
It rather seems there is an internal factor within the UN which is causing this situation. The 
internal factor is the member state India. IDSN’s first ECOSOC application was sent January 
2008. Their application has been postponed due to sixty-four questions raised by India.  
Despite providing responses to the questions, their application is still awaiting (IDSN 
October 2014). Each question raised by India automatically delays an approval of IDSN’s 
application (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014). This shows how India is able to hinder IDSN access to the 
UN machinery by deliberately blocking the issue both nationally and internationally. The 
boomerang effect is thus blocked by whom they want to bypass.  
According to Nöhrlind “the procedural tactics applied by India (...) hinders development” 
(Nöhrlind 17.11.2014). Two methods are repeatedly used through these seven years. Firstly, 
India’s timing for raising the questions seem cunning (Ibid 17.10.2014: 4). The ECOSOC 
sessions are only held in January and May each year (UN 2011: 27). Often the questions are 
raised just prior to the ECOSOC session, giving IDSN a short deadline. At times IDSN has 
nevertheless managed to respond prior to the meeting without the application being finalised. 
Secondly, India is raising duplicated questions of which has already been answered (Nöhrlind 
17.10.2014: 4). This shows India’s deliberate unwillingness in including IDSN in the UN. 
The UN is missing a mechanism handling complaints which is challenging for IDSN (Kiai 
01.09.2014: 8). IDSN is pressured through a process which is research draining and time 
consuming (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014).  
Beyond doubt, the questions raised by the committee member India is due to the 
disagreement with IDSN’s desire to dissolve caste discrimination. India is therefore refusing 
to grant them access to the UN mechanisms (Nöhrlind 17.10.2014: 3). April 2013, The High 
Commissioner for Human Rights stated that “India peculiarly thinks the word caste belongs 
to them” and "“should not be raised in international fora” (IDSN N.d. a: 7). Nöhrlind also 
believes India perceives this as an “internal affair” (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014). This is a phrase 
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being “used by states that do not want to see their human rights deficit being discussed 
internationally” (Ibid 17.11.2014). Nöhrlind is here relating caste to the lack of human rights. 
Due to the structure of organisations, they are capable of cross cutting borders. They are able 
to counteract homogenisation and thereby express orientations which are different or 
opposing the function systems (Beyer 2006: 52). This is why IDSN is problematic in India 
(Ibid: 52). It also highlights the difficulties of combining state affairs and human rights. This 
needs further elaboration (Willetts 2011: 69).  
 
4.4 The challenge of human rights and state sovereignty  
Human rights and state sovereignty may have dissimilar missions, as the international and 
UN law may contradict each other, or simply having different missions. On the one side, 
India wants to protect state sovereignty. State sovereignty is seen as established basic needs 
under international law. While on the other side, India has also ratified the human right 
treaties and hence have committed to live up to them. When human rights are affecting state 
sovereignty, they are truly challenging state affairs (Willetts 2011: 69).  
There are four fundamental principles in the human rights system: 
1. Human rights have a common standard and are therefore universal. 
2. Human rights should be a legitimate concern for both individual states and the 
international community.  
3. If the state does not live up to these commitments, it will solely be held accountable.  
4. Every institution and individual are responsible in protecting and promoting human 
rights (Cook 1996: 182). 
The human rights’ definition has been expanded since Second World War. Earlier the 
definition only applied offences against humanity. Today, the definitions also includes during 
peacetime within state boarders (Benhabib 2006: 28-29).  
Human rights promotes equality and desire to abolish discrimination. We have seen that the 
caste system is challenging these values. Nevertheless, another factor also worth mentioning 
is religious freedom. The combination of religious freedom and equality is challenging when 
describing caste. Caste is included within the religious function system while also having a 
structure based on inequality (Willetts 2011: 69). Nöhrlind confirms that issues on the subject 
of religion are challenging. This shows the difficulties regarding caste (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014).  
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According to Heiner Bielefeld, human rights does not originate from Western culture. 
However, Western culture does neither contradict human rights (Bielefeldt 2000: 100). Caste 
and human rights are rooted in distinct ideas, making it difficult to coexist. Caste determine 
inequality from birth. W. J Basil Fernando therefore emphasises that caste is based on values 
differing from the foundation of human rights. (Fernando 2002: 141). In Hindu theory there 
are some difficulties with the term of “free will”. If past lives and deeds are determining the 
future (karma), then the meaning of free will is meaningless (Velassery 2005: 149). It is 
therefore strange that India was one of the creators of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights (UDHR) (ECOSOC 24.05.1948).  
Arvind Sharma actually believe it is possible to reconcile caste and human rights. He 
describes the bases of human rights in Hinduism, translating kᾱma, artha, dharma and mokṣa 
to “the sensate, politico-economic, moral, and metaphysical dimensions of human existence” 
(Sharma 2004: 10). According to Sharma, “Hindu thinking is strongly in favour of grounding 
human rights in morality or dharma”. According to Sharma, if the human rights are grounded 
within dharma’s moral visions, it “would mean grounding them on their home ground”.  
(Ibid: 11).  
Knut Jacobsen describes the varṇā doctrine as an ideology. There is therefore no expected 
correlation between the ideology and the world, as a description of the social reality 
(Jacobsen 2010: 83). But there is no secret that caste discrimination remains deeply engrained 
in Indian institutions and social structure in spite of constitutional provisions, legislation and 
policies (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014). 
The caste structure is sustained through lower castes, and Dalits, as they are performing the 
most dangerous and less popular tasks (Fuller 2004: 15). These views contradict the 
constitution of India and the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD), mentioned previously. The 26th of January 1950, India got 
its constitution. Like other democratic constitutions, it emphasises equality and freedom 
(Fernando 2002: 157). Article 14 in India’s constitution states that all persons are equal 
before the law (Narula 1999: 208). Article 15 states: 
 (1) The state shall not discriminate against citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place 
 of birth or any of them. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth 
 or any of them, be subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or condition (Narula 1999: 208).  
62 
 
Article 17 further states that: “untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is 
forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of Untouchability shall be an offence 
punishable in accordance with law” (Narula 1999: 209). According to Indian law, it is 
impossible to be excluded from the varņa-system due to level of purity. In India today, Dalits 
constitutes approximately twenty percent of its population. This shows a contradiction to 
India’s own constitution (Jacobsen 2003: 84).  
CERD, mentioned previously, is ratified by India (United Nations Human Rights Office 
N.d.). By signing the convention, caste based discrimination is prohibited. Racial 
discrimination, is under article 1, defined as:  
 Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or 
 ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
 exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
 social, cultural or any other field of public life (Jones 07.02.2014).  
In spite of the legal structure, it seems the reality is quite another. Inequality seems rather to 
be regarded as something unique and ideal in society. While democracy emphasises 
consensus and equality, caste promotes segregation and discrimination. Despite the 
constitution’s incorporation of the terms “equality” and “freedom,” it does not suggest that 
these subject are subjugated ethical principles in society (Fernando 2002: 157). Within 
Hinduism, obligations and rights are seen as the same matter. The caste system binds people 
to certain tasks, depriving them of the right of free will (Velassery 2005: 149).  
 
4.5 Future 
Finnmore and Sikkink claim issues related to discrimination “have more transnational 
resonance than other norms” (Finnmore 1998: 907). As mentioned previously, forty-six 
human right related organisations have experienced their ECOSOC application postponed 
(IDSN 21.10.14). This exemplify the sensitivity of human rights.  
It takes time to get accustom to human rights until they are accepted. ISDN has tried to make 
use of the boomerang effect. This has nevertheless not had a positive effect. India is blocking 
ISDN at the national level, as well as from within the UN. This leaves no chance to bypass.  
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“In spite of the very strong Human Rights system of the UN, and the general acceptance, and 
appearance, clarification and signatories to this various conventions (...), states in some cases 
(...) act on double standards,” Nöhrlind says (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014). Nöhrlind questions why 
no one in the committee has asked for a vote regarding their application. This would have 
determined IDSN’s future. This shows the member states’ passivity regarding this case. 
Nöhrlind refer to the many committee members which traditionally are not to found of 
NGOs, and paradoxically, does not advocate human rights (Ibid 17.11.14). The UN 
Principles and Guidelines to Elimination Discrimination Based on Work and Descent is an 
example of this. These guidelines were published back in 2009 by the Human Rights Council. 
These guidelines are still pending (Ibid 17.10.2014: 3). Yet again, we are reminded of the 
passivity among the member states.  
So, why are the member states not doing anything? It is probable that India is the cause in the 
member states’ passivity. Nöhrlind describes a “Human Rights environment which is more 
politicised than it has been before, and where (...) power counts and not the principles (...)” 
(Nöhrlind 17.11.2014). According to Willetts, “the exercise of power is, by definition, 
influence over outcomes” (Willetts 2011: 127). If this is the case, India is extremely powerful 
in the ECOSOC committee. Nöhrlind describes a changing dynamic where IDSN is less 
influential than earlier. In five years, states are less active on this issue because of the 
repercussions mentioned earlier. Nöhrlind claim states generally “have been silenced or 
silencing themselves (...) in fear for repercussions from India”. ISDN has hoped for a quicker 
clarification from the ECOSOC. However, “states do not feel empowered to take forward a 
resolution when there is one regional (...) nation that actually do not want it.” Nöhrlind 
further states that it must be a “sad learning (...) for the Human Rights community that arms 
can so easily be twisted around the backs of states” (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014).  
October 2014, Special Rapporteur Kiai called out India at the UN General Assembly. Kiai 
brought up IDSN’s pending application and India’s, previously mentioned, sixty-four raised 
questions. India was gravely criticised. According to Kiai, legitimate organisations have on 
repeated occasions been a target by some states. It is excluding NGOs from participating 
(IDSN 29.10.14). Kiai specifies that the very committee whose mission is to include civil 
society within the UN,  is hindering IDSN access (Ibid 21.10.2014). Several states share this 
perception. It is worrisome that the committee act contrary to the ECOSOC resolution, and its 
purpose. Nöhrlind specified that IDSN is hindered a status they are entitled to (Nöhrlind 
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17.11.2014). Norwegian representatives considers this situation as unacceptable, by stating 
that “the situation should be rectified” (IDSN 29.10.2014).  
Kiai is concerned by the many reprisals working against NGOs, participating in the UN, who 
is defending human rights. The Financial Action Task Force sort to prevent abuse of NGOs. 
Times of terrorism has given new restrictions on civil society funding due to the concern of 
false intentions. Kiai is proposing a reform which makes the committee unable to block 
legitimate organisations working for human rights. The reform is supported by the UN, while 
China, Bahrain and Russia are critical. Russia is proposing that such issues should be 
resolved with the “constructive cooperation with governments” (IDSN 29.10.2014). Russia 
claim certain NGOs has a “negative impact”. The critical stance by some states toward this 
reform, might suggest an existent alliance in the UN (Ibid 29.10.2014).  
Changes take time. Human rights were neither well received by religious institutions in the 
West. Pope Pius IX condemned religious freedom and looked at it as a consequence of 
modernisation. It was not before the Second Vatican Council in the 1960’s that the Catholic 
Church recognised human rights and religious freedom (Bielefeldt 2000: 96). It is important 
to remember that human rights does not belong to one culture (Ibid: 99). The Church’s 
current relation to human rights is a result of a long and self-critical process (Ibid: 100).  
The International Human Rights and constitutional legislation may together guarantee rights 
for the Dalit population (Narula 1999: 179). However, the development of cosmopolitan 
norms seems confusing as the states are the ones enforcing them (Benhabib, 2006: 31). It is a 
paradox that Indian voters are encouraged to vote and participate through their identity. In 
reality people vote democratically based on caste. Hence, caste is an important factor in the 
Indian democracy (Jones 07.02.2014). In 2014, BJP won the election in India, further 
illustrating caste’s presence in India. The party represent “one country, one culture, one 
nation and Dharma Raj (the rule of law)” (Pillai 1990: 220). The religious-cultural caste 
system, legitimates power distribution. Both the cultural and social system is thus infiltrated 
by the caste system. When people discriminated on the background of caste, and are denied a 
right to speak, there is a growing need to be seen and heard in important forums. 
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5.0 Analysis  
The research question in this study is: why, and how, is India protecting the caste system at 
the national and international arena? Until now, the national and international level has 
been studied separately. In order to provide the most thorough presentation, the research 
question will here be divided into two: 1. why is India protecting the caste system at the 
national and international arena, and 2. how is India protecting the caste system at the 
national and international arena? The two questions will be answered from both a deductive 
and inductive point of view. Lastly, the structure will pair the national and international level 
together, while pinpointing the answers to the research questions, giving a more thorough 
answer.  
 
5.1 Why is India protecting the caste system at the national and 
international arena?  
5.1.1 A deductive approach  
Smith’s popular level focus on national and underpinning ideas (Smith 2003: 29). BJP is 
influenced by a Hindutva ideology which emphasises on the importance of belonging to a 
“Hindu nation” (Jaffrelot 2003: 476). Hence, BJP regard all Hindus as Indians. (Bhandari 
1990: 21). Rather ambiguously, Hindutva emphasises on purity while depending on low 
castes in order to maintain its position. Hence, BJP wants to include the Dalits in the “Hindu 
Raj” (Hindu rule). It is rather the Muslims and Christians which are excluded. Hence, BJP 
exploit theories of “authenticity” and “purity” by alienating non-Hindus (Nussbaum 2007: 8). 
INC regard the diversity of inhabitants within the nation’s borders as Indians (Bhandari 1990: 
21). INC therefore include all minorities and ethnicities within Indian national identity 
(Gautam 1990: 95). The two views becomes clear in the parties’ pretty stable voting trend: 
BJP has gained strong support from upper castes, and INC has received most support from 
lower castes and Muslims. This confirms their view of national identity (Heath 2010: 203).  
The underlying level described the psychological bond that binds people together as an 
“ancestral territory” (Smith 2003: 31-32). Hinduism’s construction through the political, legal 
and religious system, and through education and mass media, illustrates the ambiguous 
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relation between culture and religion (Beyer 2006: 75). Initially, Indians did not have a 
unified religious message (Ibid: 84). As a response to Christianity’s unified message, 
Hinduism adopted a similar position. This lead to a reformulating of Hindu ideals. (Beyer 
2006: 84; Tenhunen 2012: 76). Dependent on the Brᾱhmaṇas’ (the high caste) India’s history 
was reconstructed by a collaboration of the British and the Indian elite (Beyer 2006: 75).  
The relationship between a Hindu religion and a Hindu nation refers to India’s ambiguous 
relationship between religion and culture/nation (Beyer 2006: 75). Despite being a 
multicultural state, BJP view the nation as one culture (Nussbaum 2007: 3). As mentioned, 
BJP’s founder, Mookerjee, disagreed with India’s declined responsibility and involvement 
above the Hindu minority in Pakistan (Bhandari 1990: 201). BJP’s ideology dictates that 
Hindus are a nation. (Pillai 1990: 222). Their ideology fits Smith’s description of an 
“ancestral territory”: the religious community coincides with ethnicity (Smith 2003: 32). 
Despite their increasingly focus on economic growth, their relation to caste seems consistent 
(NUPI N.d. (b)). BJP has a distinct Hindu high caste identification (Pillai 1990: 229).  
INC seems to be more inclusive in their understanding of national identity. While BJP is 
talking about a cultural nationalism, INC is talking about territorial nationalism including all 
the different ethnic and religious groups on its territory (Pillai 1990: 229). INC was founded 
in order to unite Indians across caste, ethnicity and religion. They fought against British rule, 
for secularism, democracy and social justice (Chand 1990: 44). INC has further had a long-
standing focus on Dalits. They prohibited “untouchability” in the Constitution and take 
measures towards higher education among low-caste (Jaffrelot 2003: 89-90).  
Smith’s levels of national identity clearly show the parties connection to caste. Caste is 
visible through a mixture of religion and culture. According to my hypothesis: it is the 
parties’ connection to caste that protects the topic at the national and international arena. The 
hypothesis seems to be correct. The parties have indeed tried to ease the situation for low 
castes, such as by the quota system. But whether or not the intentions are genuine, the 
outcome always seem to be unfortunate for someone. BJP has, without a doubt, a direct focus 
on Hindus and to high castes in particular. Their ideology is further highly influenced by 
Hinduism. Caste is also connected to INC as part of its foundation. INC was created in order 
to secede from the British. Low castes are also INC’s major supporters. Hence, BJP and 
INC’s connection to caste may be connected to different parts of the strata, but the connection 
is nevertheless apparent.  
67 
 
5.1.2 An inductive approach  
Why is India protecting the caste system at the international arena? The inductive approach is 
clearly a continuation of the deductive approach. It is India’s view of caste, being part of their 
national identity, which protects the caste system at the international arena.  
Robertson’s theory of glocalisation was included in order to analyse the relation between the 
national and international level. Robertson’s theory seems to be valid in this research, saying 
that the local is intrinsically connected with the global (Beyer N.d. 98). Caste, within 
Hinduism, was formed as a result of the Indian elite defining itself as a counterpart to 
Christianity. Further, it is continuously redefining itself by being in contact with its 
surroundings (Ibid 2006: 75). Hence, the caste issue is glocalised by expressing itself in the 
other (Ibid N.d. 98). Further, by blocking IDSN from gaining consultative status within the 
UN, India’s national policies become reflected at the international level.  
As a social system, organisations are unique in global society in that they constitute 
themselves by distinguishing between members and non-members. They attach themselves to 
different function systems, while also crossing national borders (Beyer 2006: 51). Caste in 
itself is a hierarchical societal system, while human rights emphasises on equality. This is 
where the challenges of hierarchy versus the function system of law comes in. (Ibid: 52; Ibid: 
38-39). This explains why organisations such as IDSN are considered to be challenging in 
India (Ibid: 5). 
Nöhrlind reinforces India’s relation to caste by stating that India perceives caste as an 
“internal affair”. This is a phrase she believes states utilise regarding matters they do not want 
to be discussed at the international arena (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014). It seems her interpretation 
may be right. The High Commissioner for Human Rights says India regard caste as a private 
matter that is not to be debated internationally (IDSN N.d. a: 7). This correlates with the 
findings at the national level. Through the “construction” of Hinduism, caste has been 
blended into both religion and culture.  
As viewed at the national level, caste has become a part of how the parties view national 
identity. Being criticised for something, at the international arena, which is seen as part of 
their Indian identity must seem both intrusive and as violating “privacy”. 
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5.2 How is India protecting the caste system at the national and 
international arena?  
5.2.1 A deductive approach  
Smith’s official level looked at national identity through official doctrines and laws (Smith 
2003: 28). Both INC and BJP have been involved in launching quota systems, making it 
easier for people within low castes to pursue higher education (Hasan 2010: 165; Tenhunen 
2012: 42). Despite the majority of Dalits living in poverty, the quotas have succeeded in 
reducing social imbalances. However, the quotas polarise society and is thus strengthening 
caste distinctions (Tenhunen 2012: 40). According to Tenhunen and Säävälä, caste identities 
still linger partly due to these quotas (Ibid: 41). It is further a paradox that India prohibits 
caste discrimination in the Constitution, while implementing political support for those 
discriminated on the background of caste. Caste is hence used politically to compensate for 
its presence in society (Vaid 2010: 186). 
A caste cannot function without its system as it relies on other castes to function. In order for 
people to leave a group, they must break out of the groups’ frames while intruding others. 
This can only be achieved through consensus from the new group. Further, those who get 
their membership excluded from a group, can no longer benefit from the formulation of 
standards (Fernando 2002: 160). This means that people converting from Hinduism are losing 
the benefits from the quota system. Additionally, non-Hindus that should have been 
incorporated into the quotas, fall outside, being structurally discriminated against (Tenhunen 
2012: 186). Whether the intention is intentional or unintentional, Hindus are thus protected 
and non-Hindus are left behind. INC and BJP’s quota politics has focused mainly on Hindus 
and caste rather than all of society. This has lead to a strengthening of what Oliver Heath and 
Yogendra Yadav call “the caste-community cleavage” (Heath 2010: 206). The Indian 
Constitution, Article 25, has tried to define some minorities under the Hindu “umbrella” 
(Robinson 2012: 11; Ministry of Law and Justice. 29.07.2008). However, also this is 
problematic as it deprives human’s of their understanding of identity (Robinson 2012: 12).  
There are further a couple of incidents which stands out when describing India protecting 
caste. In 1975, Indira Gandhi was charged for “having violated election law”. She declared 
state of emergency and used her power to do constitutional changes, calling it a “disciplined 
democracy” (SNL 03.02.1015). Further, in “Operation Blue Star” in 1984, the army stormed 
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the gold temple Harmadir (Amritsar), on the instruction from Indira Gandhi. Numerous Sikhs 
were killed (Jacobsen 2006: 67). Although INC’s intentions were not driven by a motive of 
ethnic-cleansing, the aftermath suggests that the Sikh minority nevertheless saw it as such 
(Nussbaum 2007: 23).  
The incident in Gujarat, in 2002, clearly illustrated BJP’s view of national identity. BJP’s 
involvement in the incident in Gujarat is grave at the least. However, it is the involvement 
across society which is really alarming (Nussbaum 2007: 21). Political and governmental 
bodies was unwilling to stop the violence (Ibid: 2). The revolt was even aided by them (Ibid: 
21). An ideology is powerless before it is utilised. It is the utilisation of ideologies which may 
be dangerous. Evidence show that the violence in Gujarat was planned before it occurred 
(Ibid: 20). Gujarat is an example of how “a leading political party bases its appeal on a 
religious nationalism wedded on ideas of ethnic homogeneity and purity”, Nussbaum says 
(Ibid: 2). BJP has succeeded in their Muslim conspiracy. Knowing the importance of caste 
identity, BJP convinced Hindus that their common enemies are the Muslims (Ibid: 30; Ibid: 
21). Hence, low-castes are convinced “to put religion ahead of caste”, fearing Muslims rather 
than the upper-caste Hindus (Ibid: 21). According to Peter Van der Veer, this shows how a 
conflict which seems religious, “is in fact a political game” (Veer 2005: 254). The 
demolishing of the Babri Mosque in 1992, the current president’s connection to the anti-
Muslim pogrom in Gujarat in 2002, and their educational reform, all point at BJP’s political 
“identity project” and how religious ideology have threatened the rule of law in 
India (Nussbaum 2007: 1-2; Tenhunen 2012: 76; Flåten 2012: 287).  
The examples above illustrates the cohesion between the caste system and national identity. 
The two is so interconnected within the Indian way of thinking, that even the non-Hindu 
Indians are affected by it in all parts of society.  
 
5.2.2 An inductive approach  
In the case of IDSN, a Transnational Advocacy Network is highly feasible. NGOs often arise 
when a topic of concern is believed to need more attention (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014). IDSN 
wants to globalise the caste issue, putting it on the world agenda. In order to do so more 
efficiently, they need consultative status (Martens 2005: 14).  
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IDSN tries to bypass India within the UN. Despite being entitled the status and working hard, 
IDSN’s consultative status never seems to be finalised. The boomerang effect is broken 
down. The committee working to ensure better involvement and participation of NGOs is 
continuously delaying IDSN accreditation rights (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014).  
So, how is India protecting the caste system at the international arena? As a committee 
member in the UN, India is able to hinder IDSN gaining consultative status, by blocking the 
topic at both the national and international level (IDSN October 2014). By knowing the rules, 
India is able to exploit the system. Their duplicated questions and timing raising them, show 
a deliberate purpose in hindering IDSN access to the UN machinery. India is thereby 
protecting the caste system (Nöhrlind 17.10.2014: 4).  
Another example is the report, in 2007, written by the Indian government to CERD. In the 
report India claimed that discrimination based on caste is not included in the convention. 
India therefore evaded the obligation of mentioning caste in the report. The incident show 
that India is not acknowledging caste as discrimination (Jones 07.02.2014). It is a paradox 
that India denies that caste discrimination is included in CERD, while taking special 
measures towards Dalits and low castes through the quota systems. As mentioned, Berg 
describes this as two opposing trends in the Dalit situation: “the upward social mobility 
contrasting with enduring atrocities” (Berg 2011: x). By disregarding caste as discrimination, 
internationally, India is able to avoid discussing caste publicly. The examples indicates how 
India is able to protect the topic, making sure it is not discussed at the international arena.  
 
5.3 Interconnection    
The study has concluded as to why, and how, India is protecting the caste system at the 
national and international arena. The research mentioned previously in the assignment will 
now be interconnected by leading the inductive and deductive approaches together.  
Smith’s hope is that his theory of national identity may be adapted to religious and cultural 
traditions in the East (Smith 2003: 7). This is what this study has been trying to do. Smith’s 
levels of national identity was just described through the parties in the deductive approach. 
This aspect will not be mentioned again, other than to say that despite its differences in 
defining national identity, the two parties are clearly connected to caste in their own way. 
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INC and BJP’s relation to caste stems from the reaction to outer and inner processes. 
Hinduism was constructed through the political, legal and religious system, and through 
education and mass media. The genesis of Hinduism illustrates the ambiguous relation 
between culture and religion (Beyer 2006: 75). Hinduism adopted a similar position to 
Christianity, leading to a reformulating of Hindu ideals (Beyer 2006: 84; Tenhunen 2012: 
76). India’s history was reconstructed by a collaboration of the British and the Indian 
elite (Beyer 2006: 75). Hinduism was created as a result of the local responding to the global. 
Robertson’s theory saying that the local is connected with the global therefore seems correct 
As mentioned previously, my hypothesis states that the parties’ connection to caste protects 
the topic at the national and international arena. This seems to be right. The caste issue at the 
national level has constituted itself at the global level and the other way around (Beyer N.d. 
98). It is the different responses to this glocalisation process which has created the parties’ 
identity. INC was created as a response to the British colonial rule, while BJP was created as 
a response to INC. 
Caste,  though connected with the function system religion (Hinduism), is in itself a form of 
hierarchical societal communication system. India might not want other communication 
systems based on organisations and functions to interfere, as they challenge the hierarchical 
communication system of caste. Organisations are however powerful as their roles are 
connected with function systems that transcend national boundaries (Beyer 2006: 52). This is 
where the challenges of hierarchy versus the function system of law, in the form of UDHR, 
comes in. This might explain India’s tactics towards IDSN. As a committee member in the 
UN, India is able to counterbalance the power of organisations by hindering IDSN gaining 
consultative status (IDSN October 2014). Their duplicated questions and timing in raising 
questions, show a deliberate purpose in hindering IDSN access to the UN machinery 
(Nöhrlind 17.10.2014: 4). India is protecting the caste system by blocking the topic at both 
the national and international level. (IDSN October 2014). This being said, this research only 
study one caste related NGO: the IDSN. However, no other ECOSOC application has, 
currently, been pending for so long (Nöhrlind 17.11.2014). Either, this means that IDSN is 
the only caste related NGO where an application has not been approved, or that there exists 
other caste related NGOs which have been approved. Special Rapporteur Kiai have 
nevertheless recorded forty-six human rights organisations with postponed accreditations 
(IDSN 21.10.2014). It is therefore reason to believe that this could be a difficulty to several 
caste related NGOs. This issue needs more research.  
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There is a need of transparency in the application process and a complaint mechanism within 
the UN (Al Marsad et.al. 01.07.2014: 1; Kiai 01.09.2014). The responsibility of sabotage 
within the human rights system lies with the whole ECOSOC Committee. The member states 
need to get involved in order to stop the ongoing situation. As the world is becoming 
increasingly globalised, or rather glocalised, the responsibility lies with everyone. The silence 
of the other member states makes India extremely powerful.  
The cosmopolitan norms have created values and relationships that did not exist previously. 
As they cannot be justified by referring to something previously, they are facing a number of 
challenges (Benhabib 2006: 72). As the local, national and global levels are intertwined, their 
dependence on each other increase (Ibid: 74). In a globalised world where people and their 
views on the world are continuously intertwined, there is an increasing belief in equality for 
all, with discrimination as the “cursed” binary opposition. This creates tension towards caste.  
Robertson describes the complexity of inclusion within global society. One of the key 
dimension of globalisation is the rights of individuals’ “increasing power of distinctly 
impersonal societal system” (Beyer 2006: 54). This highlights Beyer’s point regarding 
hierarchy versus functional systems (Ibid: 38-39). A hierarchical societal system, as caste, is 
asymmetrically structured. It consists of groups which are both unlike and dependent of each 
other at the same time (Ibid: 40). The system exists in the same place, and is thus prohibiting 
and limiting communication (Ibid: 38). In stratified societies, such as Hinduism in India, the 
division of labour on the economic and political arena is assigned to a particular stratum 
(Ibid: 39). There is friction between caste as a hierarchical societal system and the function 
system of law and human rights, which states that everyone has the same rights. Within 
castes, people are “ranked” differently, giving them unequal rights (Ibid: 38-39).  
Systems operate, and must operate, asymmetrically due to the distribution of power. The 
systems’ asymmetric power distribution, increases individuals’ responsibility. Even the 
Brᾱhmaṇas’, i.e. the high caste’s, responsibility towards Dalits increases as they all operate 
within the same system. As the world has become glocalised, the responsibility towards 
Dalits has further become international as well as national, placing the responsibility on 
everyone (Beyer 2006: 54).  
As mentioned, human rights and state sovereignty may have dissimilar missions, as the 
international and UN law may contradict each other, or simply having different missions. On 
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the one side, India wants to protect state sovereignty. State sovereignty is seen as established 
basic needs under international law. While on the other side, India has also ratified the human 
right treaties and hence have committed to live up to them. When human rights are affecting 
state sovereignty, they are truly challenging state affairs (Willetts 2011: 69). A nation 
promises to uphold human rights while a democracy must follow the majority vote. These 
may contradict each other (Benhabib 2006: 35). While human rights are supposed to be 
universal, democracy has a distinction between members of the nation state community and 
that of the outside (Ibid: 17). Hence, moral obligations and bonds you have as a member 
within a given national community, and the ones you have as a human being, may create 
tension (Ibid: 18-19). It becomes increasingly difficult to justify practices contradicting 
democratic standpoints, as they represents the people. The democratic forces thus controls the 
cosmopolitan norms (Ibid: 71). India’s self-understanding and redefinition of democracy is 
therefore crucial for the development (Ibid: 72). Benhabib writes that in order to reconcile 
cosmopolitanism with a nation’s unique cultural and historical tradition, respect and 
democracy is required (Ibid: 70). The process cannot be forced.  
In a democracy nothing must be seen as authoritative on the basis of habit or tradition, 
mediating between the generations. One must rather examine oneself. Critical thinking is 
crucial in a society consisting of a large diversity of religions, cultures, ethnicities and caste 
(Nussbaum 2007: 291). It is the mixture of belief systems, traditions, identity, sovereignty 
and human rights which makes the caste issue so challenging to discuss within the religious 
and political arena.  
Taking responsibility for one’s own actions rather than referring to traditions is important 
(Nussbaum 2007: 292). As part of democracy, one must see oneself as part of humanity 
bound to others (Ibid: 293). One of the most important continuations one can give in a 
democracy, is to support and stimulate children’s dreams and fantasies, to see new 
opportunities, and to use other people’s experiences and situations and immerse oneself in 
them (Ibid: 296). Only then may people choose new paths and gain reinterpretations which 
moves away from caste. 
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6.0 Conclusion   
The answer to this study is mainly related to why India is protecting the caste system from its 
surroundings. In short, the answer is as follows: caste has been incorporated into Hinduism 
and has thereby also become a part of Indian national identity.  
Caste was formed, within Hinduism, as a result of the Indian peninsula’s interaction with the 
British. The Indian elite defined itself as a counterpart to Christianity and hence included the 
caste system within the term “Hinduism”. Hinduism was constructed through various 
function systems, including both the political and the religious. This lead to a re-imagination 
of what caste was. Caste became integrated in both politics and religion. Peoples obligations 
and duties could now be justified.  
Caste has become an integral part of Indian national identity. Being a part of their national 
identity, the caste system has become protected, by India, from being debated internationally. 
Being criticised internationally for something which is seen as part of their Indian identity 
must seem both intrusive and violating. This explains the sensitivity of the subject.  
The caste systems’ asymmetric power distribution, increases individuals’ responsibility as 
they all operate within the same system. Through the glocalised world, the responsibility 
towards Dalits has become national as well as international, placing the responsibility on 
everyone. The important thing to remember is that religion is constructed by the people and 
its environment. This is key as it signify that Hinduism is continuously changing. This means 
that the framework of Hinduism, and more importantly: caste, is yet not determined.  
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Appendix: Interview guide  
Introductory questions about IDSN  
 1.0 What is IDSN’s main mission?  
 2.0 Is IDSN part of an international network?  
  2.1 If so, how does the network cooperate?  
 
Religion and national identity  
 3.0 Does IDSN have a religious affiliation?  
  3.1 If so, which?  
  3.2 If not, is this a conscious choice?   
 4.0 Do you believe there is a connection between caste and religion? 
  4.1  Why/ why not?  
 5.0 Anthony D. Smith defines national identity as: 
 “The maintenance and continual reinterpretation of the pattern of values,  symbols, 
 memories, myths, and traditions that form the distinctive heritage of the nation, and 
 the identification of individuals with that heritage and its pattern.” (Smith 2003: 24-
 25). 
 With this definition in mind, do you believe there is a connection between national 
 identity and caste? 
  5.1 Why?/ Why not?  
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IDSN and UN interaction  
 6.0 What does IDSN want to achieve within the UN? 
 7.0 How does IDSN implement their strategies within the United Nations?  
 8.0 What is IDSN’s main activities within the UN?  
 9.0 Who does IDSN contact in the UN to accomplish their goals?  (Staff level or 
 political level?) 
 10.0 IDSN is not in consultative status with ECOSOC. What does this entail?  
 11.0 I have been told by Sandra Petersen, at IDSN Norway, that no one has applied 
 for consultative status as long as caste based NGOs without gaining it. Why do you 
 think that is?  
 
Subjects  
 12.0 Which topics are the easiest to implement in the UN? 
 13.0 Are any particular subjects difficult to implement?  
 14.0 Is there anything IDSN has tried to achieve within the UN which has not been 
 accomplished?  
 
Power 
 15.0 Do you consider IDSNs to be influential in the UN?  
  15.1 Why?/ Why not?  
 16.0 Is anyone in the UN in position to lay down veto against IDSN? 
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 17.0 On April 2013, the High Commissioner for Human Rights gave a statement in 
 South Africa saying, “India peculiarly thinks this word caste belongs to them and I 
 know they have a political position that it should not be raised in international fora.” 
 Do you believe India consider caste to be a private matter?  
  17.1 If so, why do you think that is?  
  17.2 If not, why do you think the High Commissioner for Human rights would 
  say so?  
 18.0 You, the Executive Director in IDSN, asked in the 2013 Annual Report why 
 caste discrimination is still “absent from the agenda of the UN human rights council.” 
 Could you try to answer your own question?  
 
If time is available, and certain topics of interests come up, some additional questions may be 
asked.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
Bibliography 
Al Marsad: the Arab Centre for Human, Asian Centre for Human Rights, Business and 
Professional Women Voluntary Organization, Child Rights International Network CRIN, 
Collectif des Familles de Disparu(e)s en Algérie, Global Network for Rights and 
Development (GNRD), National Secular Society, International Dalit Solidarity Network, 
West Africa Centre for Peace Foundation, Virtual Activism. 01.07.2014. A Call to 
Transparency in ECOSOC NGO Accreditation Process. Open Letter to the Members of the 
ECOSOC Committee on NGOs. http://idsn.org/fileadmin/pdfs/July2014/Open_Letter_to_ 
ECOSOC_Members_July2014.pdf (26.11.2014). 
Benhabib, Seyla. 2006. Another Cosmopolitanism. The Berkeley Tanner Lectures. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Berg, Dag Erik. 2011. Dalits and the Constitutional State. Untouchability Movements and 
Legal Approaches to Equality and Social Justice for India’s Scheduled Castes. Bergen: 
University of Bergen. 
Beyer, Peter. 1994. Religion and Globalization. London: Sage. 
Beyer, Peter. 2006. Religions in Global Society. London: Routledge.  
Beyer, Peter. Globalization and Glocalization. N.d. 
http://www.uk.sagepub.com/oswmedia3e/study/chapters/handbooks/handbook12.2.pdf 
(11.12.2014). 
Bhandari, Sunder Singh. 1990. “Bharatiya Jana Sangh” in: Verinder Grover (ed.), Party 
system and political parties in India vol. 5: 200-216. New Delhi: Deep & Deep publications. 
Bielefeldt, Heiner. 2000. “Western’ versus ‘Islamic’ Human Rights Conceptions? A Critique 
of Cultural Essentialism in Discussion on Human Rights” in: Political Theory, vol. 28 Nr.1: 
90-121. Beverly Hills: Sage Publication.  
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). N.d. Good Governance. http://www.bjp.org/core-issues/good-
governance (04.05.2015).  
Bryman, Alan. 2012. Social Research Method. 4th edition. New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
79 
 
Chand, Phul and Raja J. Singh. 1990. ”Hundred Years of Nation Building: Indian National 
Congress and National Integration” in: Verinder Grover (ed.), Party system and political 
parties in India vol. 5: 35-55. New Delhi: Deep & Deep publications.  
Cook, Helena. 1996. “Amnesty International at the United Nations” in: Peter Willetts (ed.), 
The conscience of the world: the influence of non-governmental organizations in the U.N. 
system. 181-213. London: Hurst & Company.  
Fernando, W. J. Basil. 2002. “An Examination of Caste Discrimination in India” in: Kirsten 
Hastrup and George Ulrich (ed.), Discrimination and toleration: new perspectives. 
International studies in human rights vol. 68: 141-163. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers.  
Finnmore, Martha & Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change” in: International Organization, 52: 887-917. doi: 10.1162/002081898550789.  
Flood, Gavin. 1996. An introduction to Hinduism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Flick, Uwe. 2014. An introduction to qualitative research. Los Angeles, California: SAGE.  
Flåten, Lars Tore. 2012. History and Identity Politics. Educational Reforms and History 
Textbooks during the Rule of the BJP. Oslo: University of Oslo.  
Fuller, C.J. 2004. The Camphor Flame. Popular Hinduism and Society in India. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.  
Gautam, Om P. 1990. “The Indian National Congress and Nation Building” in: Verinder 
Grover (ed.), Party system and political parties in India vol. 5: 92-114. New Delhi: Deep & 
Deep publications. 
Gravaas, Gunnhild. 2013. Påvirker kastesystemet forståelsen av nasjonal identitet i India? 
Unpublished material. 
Gravaas, Gunnhild. 2014. Why has International Dalit Solidarity Network not been awarded 
consultative status despite meeting the United Nations’ criteria? Unpublished material.  
Hansen, Thomas Blom. 1999. The saffron wave: democracy and Hindu nationalism in 
modern India. Princeton. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
80 
 
Hasan, Zoya. 2010. “The Die is Cast(e): The Debate on Backward Caste/ Class Quotas, 1990 
and 2006” in: Anthony F. Heath and Roger Jeffery (ed.), Diversity and change in modern 
India: economic, social and political approaches vol. 159:  165-187. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hauss, Charles. 2012. Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges. 
Cengage Learning. 
Heath, Oliver and Yogendra Yadav. 2010.”The Rise of Caste Politics: Party System Change 
and Voter Realignment, 1962-2004” in: Anthony F. Heath and Roger Jeffery (ed.), Diversity 
and change in modern India: economic, social and political approaches vol. 159:  189-217. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Høstmælingen, Njål. 2003. Internasjonale menneskerettigheter. Oslo: Universitetsforlag.  
International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN). August 2014. CASTE DISCRIMINATION 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A comprehensive compilation of how caste discrimination and 
similar forms of discrimination based on work and descent have been addressed by the UN 
treaty bodies, Universal Periodic Review, and the Special Procedures. 9th edition. 
http://www.idsn.org/fileadmin/user_folder/pdf/New_files/UN/UNcompilation.pdf 
(03.11.2014). 
International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN). October 2014. IDSN application for ECOSOC 
Status – the longest pending NGO application. 
http://idsn.org/fileadmin/pdfs/Briefs/IDSN_ECOSOC_Application_Fact_Sheet_October_201
4.pdf (26.11.2014).  
International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN). 21.10.2014. UN Special Rapporteur 
highlights unwarranted deferral of IDSN’s UN ECOSOC accreditation. http://idsn.org/news-
resources/idsn-news/read/article/un-special-rapporteur-highlights-unwarranted-deferral-of 
idsns-un-ecosoc-accreditation/128/ (07.11.2014).  
International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN). 29.10.2014. India called out at UN General 
Assembly for blocking IDSN’s UN consultative status. http://idsn.org/news-resources/idsn-
news/read/article/india-called-out-at-the-un-general-assembly-for-blocking-idsns-un- 
consultative-status/128/ (07.11.2014).  
81 
 
International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN). N.d. (a) Annual Report 2013. 2013. 
http://www.idsn.org/fileadmin/user_folder/pdf/New_files/IDSN/AnnualReport-2013-web.pdf 
(28.10.2014). 
International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN). N.d. (b) What is discrimination based on 
work and descent? http://idsn.org/?id=553 (26.11.2014)  
International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN). N.d. (c) IDSN statutes. Statutes of the 
International Dalit Solidarity Network. http://idsn.org/about-idsn/idsn-statutes/ (27.11.2014).  
IDSN Secretariat. August 2014. IDSN application for general consultative status with 
ECOSOC. Overview and status quo. http://idsn.org/fileadmin/user_folder/pdf/New_files 
/UN/ECOSOC/Note_on_IDSN_ECOSOC_application.pdf (25.11.2014).  
Jacobsen, Knut A. 2006. Sikhismen. Kristiansand: Høyskoleforlaget.  
Jacobsen, Knut A. 2010. Hinduismen. Oslo: Pax Forlag.  
Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2003. India’s Silent Revolution. The Rise of the Lower Castes in North 
India. London: Hurst & Company.  
Jeffery, Roger and Anthony F. Heath. 2010. "Incongruities, Ironies and Achievements: 
India's Tryst with Modernity" in: Anthony F. Heath and Roger Jeffery (ed.), Diversity and 
change in modern India: economic, social and political approaches vol. 159:  1-18. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Jones, Rochelle. Disabled Peoples’ international Asia-Pacific Region (DPI-AP). 07.02.2014. 
Women with disabilities. The intersection of caste and women’s rights in India. 
http://www.dpiap.org/resources/article.php?genreid=11&id=0000375&genre=Women+with+
Disabilities (03.12.2014).  
Keen, Shirin. Juli 2012. Partion of India. 
https://scholarblogs.emory.edu/postcolonialstudies/2014/06/21/partition-of-india/ 
(06.05.2013).  
Keck, Margaret E. & Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks 
in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
82 
 
Kiai, Maina. 01.09.2014. Rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. 
Sixty-ninth session. http://idsn.org/fileadmin/pdfs/Reports/Report_of_the_SR_on_Freedom_ 
of_Assembly_October_2014.pdf (26.11.2014).  
Lærd Dissertation. N.d. Purposive sampling. http://dissertation.laerd.com/purposive-
sampling.php (25.02.2015). 
Manor, James. 2010.”The Challenge of Representing the Complex Reality of India” in: 
Anthony F. Heath and Roger Jeffery (ed.), Diversity and change in modern India: economic, 
social and political approaches vol. 159:  267-275. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Martens, Kerstin. 2005. NGOs and the United Nations. Institutionalization, 
Professionalization and Adaption. New York: Palgrave. 
Matthews, Bob & Liz Ross. 2010. Research Methods. A practical guide for the social 
sciences. Harlow: Pearson Longman.     
Ministry of Law and Justice. 29.07.2008. The Constitution of India. 
http://lawmin.nic.in/coi/coiason29july08.pdf (17.05.2013).  
Narula, Smita. 1999. Broken people. Caste Violence against India’s “Untouchables”. New 
York: Human Right Watch.  
Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI). N.d. (a) Valg 2014: et nytt India? Del 2: Et parti som 
manglet leder. http://hvorhenderdet.nupi.no/Artikler/2014-2015/Valg-2014-et-nytt-
India/%28part%29/2 (09.03.2015).  
Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI). N.d. (b) Valg 2014: et nytt India? Del 4: Valget i 
2014. http://hvorhenderdet.nupi.no/Artikler/2014-2015/Valg-2014-et-nytt-
India/%28part%29/4 (09.03.2015).  
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2007. The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence, and India’s 
Future. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.  
Nöhrlind, Rikke. 17.10.2014. URGENT APPEAL: Reprisals against IDSN by the 
Government of India in trying to formalize its association with the UN and obtain ECOSOC 
Status. http://www.idsn.org/fileadmin/pdfs/Urgent_Appeal/Urgent_Appeal_-_IDSN_-
_October_2014.pdf (26.11.2014).  
83 
 
Nöhrlind, Rikke. 17.11.2014. Skype interview with Executive Director of International Dalit 
Solidarity Network. Unpublished material. 
Obama, Barack. 27.04.2015/04.05.2015. "Nardendra Modi. India's reformer-in-chief" in: 
TIME's, The World's most influential people vol.185, No.15-16.  
Pillai, K. Raman. 1990. “Jan Sangh: A Rightist Opposition” in: Verinder Grover (ed.), Party 
system and political parties in India vol. 5: 217-233. New Delhi: Deep & Deep publications.  
Prasad, Ram Chandra. 2009. Working of the Congress Party. New Delhi: Classical 
Publishing Company.  
Robinson, Rowena. 2012. Minority Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sekhon, Joti. 2000. Modern India. Boston: McGraw-Hill College.  
Sharma, Arvind. 2004. Hinduism and human rights. A conceptual approach. New Dehli: 
Oxford University Press.  
Smith, Anthony D. 2003. Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Snieder, Roel & Kenneth L. Larner. 2009. The Art of Being a Scientist: A Guide for Graduate 
Students and their Mentors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Store Norske Leksikon (SNL). 31.05.2014 (a) Kongresspartiet. https://snl.no/Kongresspartiet 
(09.03.2015).  
Store Norske Leksikon (SNL). 31.05.2014. (b) BJP. https://snl.no/BJP (09.03.2015).  
Store Norske Leksikon (SNL). 03.02.1015 Indias historie. https://snl.no/Indias_historie 
(08.04.2015). 
United Nations (UN). 2011. Working with ECOSOC: an NGOs Guide to Consultative Status. 
http://csonet.org/content/documents/BrochureLite.pdf (02.12.2014). 
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 24.05.1948. India and the United 
Kingdom: Proposed Amendments to the Draft Declaration on Human Rights. http://daccess-
dds ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/GL9/001/71/PDF/GL900171.pdf?OpenElement 
(08.12.2014).  
84 
 
United Nations Human Rights Office of the of the High Commissionaire for Human Rights. 
N.d. View the ratification status by country or by treaty. 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx (03.12.2014).  
Tagore, Rabindranath. 1931. The religion of man: the Hibbert lectures for 1930. London: 
Allen & Unwin.   
Tenhunen, Sirpa and Minna Säävälä. 2012. An introduction to changing India: culture, 
politics and development. New York: Anthem Press. 
Vaid, Divya and Anthony Heath. 2010.”Unequal Opportunities: Class, Caste and Social 
Mobility” in: Anthony F. Heath and Roger Jeffery (ed.), Diversity and change in modern 
India: economic, social and political approaches vol. 159: 129-164. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Veer, Peter Van der. 2005. “Writing Violence” in: David Ludden (ed.), Making India Hindu: 
Religion, Community, and the politics of democracy in India. 2ed edition. New Dehli: Oxford 
University Press.  
Velassery, Sebastian. 2005. Casteism and Human Rights. Toward an Ontology of the Social 
Order. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International.  
Vohra, Ranbir. 2013. The Making of India. A Political History. New York: M. E. Sharpe. 
Wiletts, Peter. 1996. The conscience of the world: the influence of non-governmental 
organizations in the U.N. system. London: Hurst & Company.  
Wiletts, Peter. 2011. Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The constructions 
of global governance. London: Routledge.  
 
